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cH~rER ~ 
I l~i"t'RODUC~'IOI~i 
Food soybean has been one of the most important agricultural products traded 
between the US and Japan. As it is observed in the following chapter, the US has been the 
largest exporter of food grade soybeans to Japan. 
However, not so many studies on food soybean trade between the US and Japan have 
been done. Especially, studies on the contractual relationships in the food soybean 
transactions are very ew. 
This case study research aims to shed light on the transactional aspects of the food 
soybean trade between US suppliers _and Japanese soybean distributors. 
The main focus of this paper is on the risk management for Japanese distributors. The 
background and the rationales for specific risk management methods will be discussed with 
the focus on the roles of trust in the food soybean transactions. The discussion is based on the 
information obtained by individual interviews with Japanese distributors, Japanese soybean 
food manufacturers, US suppliers, and other business entities in the transaction. 
2 
CHx~TER 2 
THE OVERVIEW OF FOOD SOYBEAN TRADE 
In this chapter, we will first explain the characteristics of the major soybean foods in 
Japan (section 2-1). Second, we will observe two representative soybean product markets, 
tofu and natto markets, focusing on how they have developed and how their market 
structures are changing (section 2-2). We have selected these two representative products in 
the Identity-Preserved part of the food soybean procurement system. 
From the available literature and data, we will observe the changes in the final 
product markets, how these changes affect the strategies of makers and distributors, and the 
resulting changes in the food soybean trade. In section 2-3, we will overview food soybean 
trade between the US and Japan. In that section we will develop a detailed description of the 
physical distribution channel for food soybeans from the US farmers to the Japanese food 
makers. In addition, we will describe the roles of the firms operating in the value chain of 
food soybeans. Information was obtained through personal interviews with people in 
Japanese and US soy industries. These interviews were used to add depth to the analysis. 
The impact of introduction of Identity-Preserved (IP) handling on the food soybean 
transactions as the industry incorporated it will be mentioned in some parts of this chapter. 
Although IP handling was not a main focus of this paper, the movement to IP may have some 
impacts on the food soybean business. 
2-1 The characteristics of the major soybean foods and the demand 
characteristics for tofu/natto soybeans 
Tofu is solidified soymilk. In the production process for tofu, makers soak the 
soybeans in the water for more than 8 hours, thereby permitting the soybeans to absorb water. 
Then the soybeans are crushed and boiled in the hot water to obtain soymilk. To solidify the 
soymilk, a coagulant called "nigari" (magnesium chloride) is added to the soymilk. 
Since tofu is made from soymilk and its major ingredient is protein, the protein 
content of the soybeans is the most important single content factor necessary to get high 
yields in tofu production. Thus, tofu manufacturers strongly prefer high protein soybeans. 
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Manufacturers usually prefer uniformly large-seeded soybeans because large-seeded 
soybeans usually contain higher levels of protein. Manufacturers prefer raw soybeans of 
uniform size because uniformity of the seed size is important in producing tofu of uniform 
quality. If the seed size is not uniform, it is difficult to keep the absorption rate of water 
constant in the soaking process, and as a consequence the quality of tofu may eventually vary 
widely. 
The color of the soybean seed coat is another important concern. Makers prefer 
uniformly white/yellow colors of soybean seeds for two reasons. The tofu manufacturers sell 
the hulls of the soybeans remaining after the soybeans have been crushed and the soymilk 
has been extracted to feed producers and fish meal producers. These buyers prefer uniformly 
white color hulls rather than black color scattering hulls. Even more importantly, tofu 
manufacturers are likely to prefer soybeans of uniformly colored skin, mainly because they 
believe that uniformly colored soybeans are more likely to be high quality. Some makers 
prefer white (clear) hilum soybeans for the similar reasons stated above, but other makers do 
not care much, because the color of soybean hilum is generally not a critical factor of tofu 
quality (Soybean Stable Supply Association, 1994). 
There are many popular ways of cooking tofu in Japan. It is popular to eat raw tofu 
with minced green onions, thin-sliced dried bonito and soysauce. During winter, many 
Japanese boil tofu in the soup stock and eat it with minced green onions and soysauce. It is 
also popular to cut tofu .into small cubic pieces and put the cubes into miso soup. 
Miso is fermented and salted soybean paste. To produce miso, the raw soybeans are 
steamed, mashed and mixed with a small amount of steamed rice and/or wheat. The mixture 
is then fermented in the warming storage house after a culture of miso bacteria has been 
sprayed. Then, the matured fermented soybean paste becomes a moist paste miso. Miso is 
usually sold in 300-500 gram plastic containers. 
Miso is used as a seasoning. The major use of miso is to make miso soup, but there 
are many other usages. Miso soup is usually served with rice in a breakfast meal. For an 
example of another usage, miso is put on the sliced mackerel meat and grilled together. 
Natto is fermented soybean. A rough sketch of the production process is as follows. 
First, the soybeans are soaked to permit the soybeans to absorb water. Then they are boiled in 
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hot water and a culture of natto bacteria is sprayed on the cooked soybeans. The soybeans are 
then put in the warming storage house for about 8 hours to permit fermentation. 
To make good natto, the sugar content of the soybeans is the most important factor. In 
addition, natto manufacturers usually prefer small-seeded soybeans mainly because Japanese 
consumers have a preference for small-seeded natto. Many Japanese consumers eat natto by 
mixing it with steamed rice, and they prefer small-seeded natto since the small-seeded natto 
matches the size of the rice grain better and creates better texture of the natto-rice mixture. 
Manufacturers also prefer uniformly-sized soybeans for reasons similar to the ones outlined 
above for tofu (i. e., uniform absorption) and because of consumer preferences for the more 
uniform-sized seeds. 
Natto manufacturers have more rigid requirements for natto soybean appearance than 
manufacturers of either tofu or miso. This is because natto retains whole the soybeans 
structure and appearance in the final product, while the soybeans are crushed and the raw 
soybean shape is lost in the production process of tofu and miso. 
2-2 The overview of soybean food markets in Japan 
In this section, we will overview the markets of two soybean food products in Japan. 
First, whole soybean product markets are simply reviewed, and in the following subsections, 
we will pick up tofu and natto markets and review the market structures. 
2-2-1 The overview of food grade soybean markets in Japan 
Japan has been one of the largest importers in the world for several decades, as shown 
in Table 1. Japan has been importing many of these soybeans from the US as shown in Table 
2. Table 2 shows that between 1965 and 1985 the demand for soybeans (for oil, food, and 
feed) more than doubled. But after 1985, the demand has remained at about the same level-
around 5 millions metric tons. The US has been the largest exporter to Japan for these 3 5 
years, while China and Brazil have held a more or less constant share. Canada has increased 
its share steadily for the past 3 5 years. 
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Table 1. Import of soybeans, by importing country, metric ton (MT) 
1965 1975 1985 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2~0 
China 1 b1,400 854,437 1,469,882_ 2,87b,026 3,797,324 S,b33,439 5,194,62b, b,b73,142 12,720,810 
Netherlands 390,970 1,282,059 2,9b0,249 5,371,855 4,339,20 4,830,30 5,469,100 4,875,b01 5,381,490 
Japan 1,847,470 3,333,753 4,909,505 4,813,489 4,870,324 S,OSb,935 4,751,360 4,884,212 
4,Ob7,280~ 
4,829,378 
3,984,88b Mexico 2,870 22,039 1,493,793 2,232,453 3,048,040 3,410,8b4 3,489,399 
Germany 1,332,290 3,501,742 2,90,03b 2,90b,862 2,737,122 3,048,103 3,51 b,978_ 4,218,293 3,840,424 
Other 2,930,273 7,317,402 12,103,504 15,119,530 14,074,715 17,041,b89 1 b,106,819 17,092,483 17,Sb4,838 
World b,bb5,273 1b,311,432_ 25,83b,969 33,320,215 32,8bb,725 39,021,330 38,528,282 41,811,01 1 48,321,826 
Source: Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations 
Table 2. Supply origins and demand of soybeans, Japan, 1000 MT 
Year 1965 1975 1985 1990 1995 199b 1997 1998 1999 2000(est.) 
Supply 
Domestic 240 133 238 272 99 119 148 145 158 
US 1465 3041 4345 
~- 
3456 4065 3931 3891 3735 3867 
China 376 - 284 195 158 166 135 144 
Brazil - - 22 857 362 379 559 524 585 
Canada 7 8 - 44 53 75 90 98 163 
Paraguay - - - - 131 300 300 231 81 
Other 6 293 565 84 60 102 141 126 207 
Total Import 1847 3334 4910 4681 4813 4870 5057 4751 4884 4800 
Total Supply 
(exclude 
inventory) 2087 3467 5148 4953 4912 4989 5205 4896 5042 
Demand 
Oil 1389 2620 3928 3630 3712 3679 3781 3616 3751 3720 
Food 624 836 921 994 974 1038 1019 1046 1017 1020 
Feed - 30 70 95 110 110 110 105 105 100 
Total 
Demand 
(exclude 
inventory) 2013 3486 4919 4719 4796 4827 4910 4767 4873 4840 
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery (2000, [a]). 
Demand for soybeans, given in Table 2, indicates that about 75% are used for oil 
production, 20% are for soybean food production, and 5% are for feed. The soybean demand 
was calculated as the equivalent amount of soybeans required to produce the amount of 
consumed final products (oil, food, and feed). Soybean demand has not changed greatly in 
the past 15 years. It has remained at about 5 million metric tons for the past ten years. 
Between 1965 and 1985, the demand level had more than doubled. Demand for food soybean 
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has followed this pattern as well. Though it also increased between 1965 and 1990, it 
stabilized at around 1 million metric tons after that. This implies that the soybean food 
market in Japan has already matured. 
The amounts of imported soybeans by each type of soybeans are shown in Table 3. 
Note IOM1 has begun to decrease after 1997 and while at the same time specific variety 
soybeans like Vinton2 have begun to increase dramatically. Canadian and Japanese soybean 
have also increased since then. This implies that more and more firms have shifted from IOM 
to specific US variety soybeans, Canadian soybeans, and Japanese soybeans. 
Table 3. Supply of food soybeans to Japan, by type and origin (Estimation), 1000 MT 
IOM Beeson Vinton etc. Canada China Total Japanese Food soybean total 
1992 827 35 70 23 262 1,217 72 1,289 
1493 658 32 90 58 190 1,028 68 1,096 
1994 780 30 80 36 208 1,134 40 1,174 
1995 847 27 120 58 195 1,247 50 1,297 
1996 775 25 130 75 158 1,163 70 1,233 
1997 789 20 140 90 166 1,205 60 1 ,265 
1998 730 18 l 70 98 136 1,152 70 1,222 
1999 600 15 200 163 143 1,121 90 1,21 1 
2000 400 13 300 239 139 1, 091 120 1, 21 1 
2001(Est.) 350 10 400 200 100 1,060 150 1,210 
Source: Shokurvo Sang~•o Shimbumsha (Food Industry Daily) 
Table 4 shows how food soybeans have been used in Japan for the most recent 11 
years. Half of food soybeans are used for tofu production, 15% are for miso, 10% are foi-
natto. These three products have been the major soybean products in Japan. Among popular 
soybean products in Japan only soybean used for natto and soy milk have shown growth in 
these years. 
1 IOM stands for Indiana, Ohio. and Michigan. In the earl~~ era of US-Japan soybean trade in 1950's, food 
soybeans are not separated from soybeans for oil. At that time. they selected large-grain soybeans from the bulk 
soybeans and sold them as food soybeans after they imported bulk soybeans into Japan. But in 1960's, they 
began to separate the soybeans produced in tl~e three states, because the soybeans from the three states had the 
good attributes, i.e., large-grain and lugh-protein. and «ere suitable for producing tofu. IOM soybeans are in 
most cases shipped by bulk through St. La«~rence Ri~•er to tl~e east coast, and then are carried down to south 
through Pa~riama Canal to Japan. See the section 2-2 in ~~'hlch soybean flow from the US to Japan is depicted. 
` Vinton and Beeson are respecti~•ely specific ~•arieties of soybeans popular among tofu makers. Vinton is a 
large-seeded soybean variet<~ «•ith ~~~hite hilulil. Vinton and Beeson contain relatively high protein and then are 
good for producing tofu. 
Table 4. Food soybean consumption, by product, 1000- MT 
Total Miso Soysauce 
Tofu ~ 
- Fried Tofu Natto Dried Tofu Soy Milk Other 
1990 992 179 6 485 99 31 4 166 
1989 1,010 177 11 490 104 31 4 187 
1990 994 172 24 494 107 31 3 203 
1991 1,013 171 22 494 108 31 3 137 
1992 1,037 176 25 494 108 31 3 159 
1993 965 173 23 492 109 31 3 152 
1994 978 165 22 493 109 30 3 207 
1995 974 162 27 493 110 30 3 182 
1996 1,038 167 27 492 115 
~ 
30 3 205 
1997 1,019 165 26 494 122 30 3 176 
1998 1,046 162 26 495 128 30 4 205 
1999 1,017 163 30 492 127 29 6 180 
2000 1,010 163 30 492 122 29 7 167 
2001 Est.) 1,020 163 30 493 124 30 7 173 
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry) and Fishery of Japan (2000, [b]) 
Table 5. Price (CIF) range of food soybeans by type, 
yen per 60 kilograms and dollar per bushel, year 1998 
Use and Variety Price Range yen per 60 kg dolllar per bushel 
~: 
IOM 3000- 1 1.34-
US variety 4200-6000 15.88-22.68 
Japanese 
::_ 
~aa 
7000-9000 26.46-34.02- --- - ---
US variety 7200-9000 27.22-34.02 
Chinese 3000- 1 1.34-
Japanese 9000-12000 34.02-45.36 
~.. 
US variety 6000-7800 22.68-29.48 
Japanese 1 1 000-1 4500 41.58-54.81 
:~~_ 
US and Canada 3000- 1 1.34-
Chinese 3000- 1 1 .34-
Japanese 7000-9000 26.46-34.02 
Notes: Calculated under the assumption that 1 dollar = 120 yen and 
1 bushel = 27.216 kg. The prices for Japanese soybeans do not 
include government support payment. 
Source: Shimizu, T. Original data: Soybean Workshop in 1999, The 
Ministry of Agriculture, Forestr~~, and~Fishery 
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Finally, Table 5 shows price ranges of US food soybeans. Natto soybeans are 
generally more expensive than tofu soybeans. The main reason is that the yield of natto 
soybeans are generally lower than for other varieties. 
Use of tofu and nano markets for study 
The tofu and natto markets were selected as focal points for study. Since the tofu 
market is the biggest soybean product market and consumes slightly more than So% of all 
food soybeans, its market trend has influence on the food soybean trade. Although the miso 
market is the second largest market, the natto market was selected, because natto needs 
higher-quality specif c trait soybeans than tofu and miso. This permits more interesting 
comparisons with tofu. Cooked whole soybean requires higher-quality soybeans than either 
tofu or natto, but the market size is much smaller. Considering these facts, the tofu and natto 
industries were analyzed as the first step in researching the soybean food system in this paper. 
However, since the other soybean product markets, that is, miso, cooked soybean, and shoyu 
(soy-sauce) markets, may have unique and economically interesting issues arising from 
different market structures, investigation of those markets will be one of the potential 
directions for the future research. 
2-2-2 The overview of tofu market3
Kiyono focuses on the recent changes in the tofu market and industry structure in 
Japan from the perspective of demand-driven changes and how they affect the structure of 
the tofu market and industry. Kiyono relates those changes to the diversity observed in the 
strategies pursued by tofu makers. These changes include the decline of small sellers and 
manufacturers of tofu and the emergence and the prosperity of supermarkets. He reveals that 
these changes in the retail market for tofu have led tofu makers at other levels in the value 
chain to seek. their own unique strategies. 
3 This section depends on Ki~'ono fOr tale II1~iI1~~ parts. 
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The structure of tofu industry 
The degree of concentration in the tofu industry is relatively low compared to 
concentration observed in other food industries. This is said to be because tofu is so 
perishable and soft that it is difficult for manufacturers to ship the product to markets very far 
from their plants, or to store the products for a long period. These conditions make it tough 
for manufacturers to expand their market to a broader area or to distribute through a long 
distribution chains (Kiyono, Saeki). Although large manufacturers have been increasing their 
share in the market as technological innovations (such as larger production equipment and 
superior packing technology) make it possible to obtain economies of scale and to ship the 
products to more distant markets, many small and medium makers still successfully operate 
in the market. In Table 6, it is observed that local and small tofu manufacturers with less than 
3 employees make up about 60% of the total number of tofu manufacturers, although their 
sales share is only 8%. 
Local and small tofu manufacturers are in most cases also small tofu retailers. These 
small tofu manufacturers daily se11 all of the tofu they make each day- usually in the early 
morning to neighborhood consumers. While such mom and pop shops were the majority in 
the market until 1960's, their share began to fall off when supermarkets appeared and 
became the main player in the food retail market. 
Table 6. The number of tofu makers and the sales by size of firm, year 1998 
Number of makers Sales 
Number of emploees Number of makers Share Sales~l million yens share 
less than 3 4,345 59 30,508 8 
4 to 9 2,1 14 29 63,267 16 
10 to 19 413 6 43,467 11 
20 to 29 241 3 58,581 15 
30 to 49 96 1 45,237 11 
50 to 99 86 1 72,268 18 
100 to 199 23 0 47,973 12 
200' to 2 9 9 8 0 x } 8 300 to 499 2 0 x 
Tota I 7, 328 100 394, 519 100 
Source: The Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and Fishery (2000, [a]). Original data: Industry 
Statistics, The Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry of Japan 
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The impact of the emergence of supermarkets on tofu industry 
As supermarkets displaced small retailers, several significant changes occurred in the 
upstream tofu industry. 
First, the supermarkets required stable and mass delivery ofuniform-quality products. 
This motivated the manufacturers to introduce large scale plants and to equip refrigerator 
cars (Kiyono). As those technological changes settled, some supermarkets began to pull tofu 
manufacturers into an alliance. These changes resulted in the differentiation among the 
manufacturers in tofu market. That is, tofu manufacturers split into three more or less distinct 
groups. The first group consisted of relatively small and local family manufacturers and 
retailers who mainly produce and sell tofu to neighborhood customers. The second consisted 
of medium sized manufacturers who mainly sell tofu into local supermarkets. The last is 
large scale tofu makers who hold strong relationship with the large supermarkets. In Table 6, 
the makers with less than 3 employees may be categorized as the first group, and the makers 
with 4 to 19 employees as the second group, and the makers with more than ZO employees as 
the third group . 
Because the total volume in the tofu market has remained constant for a long time, the 
supermarkets and small retailers struggle to retain a share of the total pie. The position of 
smaller makers has been more difficult because supermarkets' prices are generally lower than 
the smaller retailers' prices. The smaller retailers' share has been steadily taken away by 
supermarkets, and the number of small retailers has declined dramatically. 
Second, as a closer relationship between supermarkets and manufacturers developed, 
supermarkets demanded more concession by manufacturers without compensation. For 
example, supermarkets require frequent delivery of smaller quantities of tofu from 
manufacturers without any compensation. This requires the manufacturers to bear more 
delivery cost without added margin. However, in order to compete with other manufacturers, 
many manufacturers have accepted the requirement (Kiyono). 
These changes in the retail tofu market were also accompanied with another change 
in tofu industry. Many industry people stated in the interviews that consumer demand for 
tofu is split into two streams. One is the demand for low-priced tofu and the other is the 
demand for high-quality tofu. Supermarkets have entered both market segments. Low-priced 
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tofu is sold at bargain price specials by supermarkets, while high-quality tofu is also 
regularly carried in the shelves in supermarkets. Small family-owned tofu makers typically 
have only 1-2 kinds of tofu products. Some of such small makers produce high quality tofu, 
while other small makers produce low-priced tofu. 
The impact of the changes on tofu soybean demand 
Tofu manufacturers in Japan began to depend on North and South American countries 
for the supply of tofu soybeans when the amount of production of domestically produced and 
imported Chinese soybeans declined in 1960's. But more recently, Japanese food soybeans 
began to increase because of government support, and tofu manufacturers began to use more 
Japanese soybeans, as more Japanese soybeans became available and the prices got lower. 
Since Japanese soybeans are mainly dealt in by domestic distributors, to procure Japanese 
soybeans, tofu manufacturers tend to make tighter relationship with distributors than before 
(Kiyono). 
According to the comments obtained in the interviews, Japanese soybeans hold both 
some advantages and some disadvantages for tofu manufacturers compared to imported 
soybeans. The advantages of Japanese soybeans are that the quality is so high that tofu 
makers can produce good tofu, and that tofu produced with Japanese soybeans holds higher 
added value when promoted as domestic when they are sold to consumers4. The 
disadvantages are ~ the quality is not stable year to year 0 the quality is not consistent 
depending on the production area 0 the prices still remain at a relatively high level 
compared to the imported soybeans. These disadvantages have tended to deter many makers 
from using Japanese soybeans. However, because of the good climate and government 
support, production increased dramatically in 2000 as Table 3 shows, which led a price 
decline. Lower prices have enabled more manufacturers to afford Japanese soybeans. Some 
soybean-purchase managers in the interviews indicated that the difference between Japanese 
4 When makers attempt to differentiate their tofu as high-quality one, they tend to use Japanese soybeans, but 
not imported soybeans, except organic soybeans. Some interviewees mentioned that US variety soybeans are 
sometimes better in quality than Japanese soybeans, but tofu produced with US soybeans don't hold added 
value as tofu with Japanese soybeans do due to consumer preference. This would be a barrier to be overcome 
for US soybeans. 
12 
soybean price and the US variety soybean price has shrunk by 2000 yen per 60 kilograms 
(approximately 7.9 US dollars per bushel) since 2001. If this trend continues and more 
Japanese soybeans get into the food soybean market, the demand for US food soybeans is 
likely to be adversely affected. Despite the recent trend, however, some people interviewed 
doubted that production of Japanese soybeans would continue to increase steadily in the 
future . 
In spite of the preference for Japanese soybeans, many tofu manufacturers currently 
have to depend on imported soybeans resulting from the general disadvantages of Japanese 
soybeans described above. The changes in the industry as Kiyono described in his paper 
seem to affect the trade of imported soybeans, too. 
See Figure 1. This figure shows tofu soybean supply by variety and origin. 
MT 
600,000 
500,000 
400,000 
300,000 
200,000 
100,000 
0 
1993 1996 1998 1999 2000 2001(est.) 
®IOM and others 
®Vinton, Other Variety 
®Japanese 
Beeson 
®Chinese, Canadian, etc. 
Figure 1. Supply of soybeans for tofu, MT 
Source: Shokur~~o Sanyo Shimbumsha (Food Industry Daily) 
IOM soybeans dramatically declined for these 10 years, while Vinton and other 
varieties have increased and displaced IOM as the largest volume category. Most soybean 
purchase managers for the tofu makers and for the whole raw soybean distributors 
interviewed stated that more makers and distributors have begun to deal with imported 
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variety soybeans in recent years. This is especially true after genetically modified (GM or 
GMO) soybeans were introduced in 1997. 
Note that, in general, specific variety soybeans are shipped by containers, while 
soybeans for oil and IOM soybeans are shipped by bulk in large vessels. Hence, in Figure 1, 
the increase in the amount of specific variety soybeans implies that container shipments 
increased and displaced some of the bulk shipment IOM soybeans. 
This change has affected the handling procedures in the US soybeans trade in that it 
required IP handling. Many interviewees indicated that since container shipment is superior 
to bulk shipment in terms of the reliability of IP handling, many distributors began to use it. 
But perhaps even more important, the changes in the tofu industry described above motivated 
tofu makers and soybean distributors to differentiate tofu by using different varieties of 
soybeans. As a soybean trader employed by a distributor said, "IP handling by itself doesn't 
add value any more. We have to import soybeans different from the ones other distributors 
are dealing with." 
This comment seems to reveal the direction the industry has taken. IP handling alone 
doesn't add unique value to soybeans anymore, because established IP handling systems 
have already been available for all of the distributors. Most of the distributors interviewed 
believed that all of the food soybeans in Japan are handled in a sound IP system, and that the 
GM contamination level is kept quite lows. Another distributor interviewee said, "In the very 
early stage of the GM fuss, makers paid premium for IP handling. IP handling was a way for 
distributors to differentiate themselves. But after several years, it was not any more." This 
comment is interesting mainly because it seems that the distributor categorized IP handling 
only as a way of differentiation. When GM soybeans emerged in the market in 1997, the 
Japanese government didn't have any regulation governing GM labeling of the final products. 
Some of soybean makers used Non-GM soybeans handled separately from GM soybeans in 
5 The research completed b}~ Shokuhin Sangyo Center (Tlle Center for Food Industry), an research institute 
supported by the Ministry of Agriculture, Forestr~~, and Fishery of Japan, concluded that the contamination level 
should be kept lower than 5% if soybeans are properly handled in an IP handling system. Based on the research, 
the 5%threshold became an unofficial criterion for IP handling in the industry. But in the actual business, many 
industry people I met indicated that supermarkets v~~ill not accept soybeans if qualitative test shows positive, 
even if quantitatively, the contamination is less than ~%. This requires strict IP handling for food soybean 
dealers, and consequently, most food soybean dealers actually achieve quite low contamination level, even less 
than 1 %. 
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producing soybean foods, and put private Non-GM label of their final products. At that time, 
IP handling played the role of differentiating the soybeans for distributors, and makers were 
willingly to pay for the additional cost. 
However, just before the Japanese government decided to make GM labeling 
mandatory (Non-GM labeling was made voluntary) in 2001, many the distributors began to 
procure soybeans through IP handling system, because they were sure that consumers would 
never buy soybean products under a GM label. After all the food soybeans had been replaced 
with Non-GM soybeans, IP handling was no longer a means of differentiating soybean for 
food uses. As a result, some interviewees stated that makers don't want to pay anything 
additional for IP handling now. Using IP handling properties, they began to deal with more 
variety soybeans as we see in Figure 1, while some distributors continue to handle non 
specific variety Non-GM soybeans in bulk. IP handling can be viewed as the trigger which 
torched the shift away from IOM soybeans to the specific variety soybeans that allow makers 
and distributors to better differentiate their products6. 
2-2-3 The overview of natto market' 
~'he structure of nano industry 
Shimizu, A. focuses on the recent structural changes in natto food system and how 
natto makers have responded to those changes. In particular, Shimizu, A. focuses on the 
strategies of natto makers and applies Kotler's categorization of an individual firm's position 
in the market. According to Shimizu, A., the market structure of the natto market appears to 
have been created by the oligopolistic structure and prosperity of supermarkets. 
The consumption of natto has grown by three fold since 1965. In part the growth 
occurred because people have come to believe soybean products like natto and tofu are good 
6 Tachikawa also pointed out that 1P handling s~~stem, moti~~ated by mandatory GM labeling accelerated the 
structural changes of grain marketing sti~steil~. See Tacl~ika~;~a for detailed explanation of the development of 
food soybean market in Japan. According to 1~i11i. the de~•elopinent of food soybean market in Japan holds three 
phases as follows. ~l 1960's: differentiation of food-grade so~~bean market (IOM soybean) 2 1980's: advent 
of variety-specific soybean 3` 2(~t)O's: containerisation of trade and reversal of IOM and variety-specific 
soybean (Tachikawa, p.4). 
~ This section greatly depends on Shimizu. A. 
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for their health. In addition, the natto market has expanded to the western part of Japan where 
natto had not been as popular as in eastern part of Japan (Shimizu, A., Saeki). In households, 
_expenditures on natto purchases have dramatically increased (by as much as 2.5 times in 
2000 compared to levels in 1965), while expenditures on tofu has remained at the same level 
during the period, as shown in Table 7. While the natto consumption has increased for these 
decades, the number of natto manufacturers has dropped dramatically, and the market has 
become somewhat more oligopolistic with a large competitive fringe as Tables 8 and 9 show. 
Table 7. The annual real expenditures of the soybean foods, per 
person in a household, yen (consumer price index standard: year 1995) 
Year Tofu Nano Miso Soyscuce 
1965 2242.6 (100) 432.8 (100) 1644.9 (100) 1696.0 (100) 
1970 2421.7 (95.2) 469.2 (108.4) 1566.2 '95.2) 1585.5 (93.5) 
1975 2336.5 ' 104.2) 501.5 (115.9) 1380.1 (83.9) 1407.7 (83.0) 
1980 2330.3 (103.9) 612.8 (141.6; 1274.4 (77.5; 1226.8 (72.3) 
1985 2450.6 (109.3; 704.7 (162.8) 1143.8 (69.5) 1055.2 (62.2; 
1990 2369.8 (105.7) 949.6 (219.4) 1029.0 "62.6) 904.3 (53.3) 
1995 2228.7 '99.4) 915.8 (21 1.6; 987.1 (60.0) 871.3 (51.4) 
2000 _2244.6 (100.1) 1087.7 (251.3) 1016.3 (61.8) 797.6 (47.0) 
Source: Shimizu; A. Original source: The Annual Report on the Household 
Economy, Annual Report on the Consumer Prices, The Statistics Bureau and 
Statistics Center, The Ministry of Public Management, Home Affairs, Posts and 
Telecommunications of Japan 
Table 8. The number of approved natto manufacturers 
Year The Number of Firms 
1965 1192 
1999 720 
Source: Shimizu, A. Original source: Sanitary Administration 
Activity Report, The Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare of 
Japan 
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Table 9. Natto sales and the share by sales ranking, 100 million yen 
Year Top 1 (Maker T) Top 2-5 Top 6-10 CR 10 Total Sales 1 Share Sales~Share Sales~Share Sales~Shnre 
1987 57 10.8 104 19.8 94 18.0 241 46.0 524 
1990 107 14.2 161 21.3 161 21.3 399 52.8 755 
1995 204 20.4 287 28.7 150 15.0 641 64.2 998 
1999 273 23.8 384 33.4 180 15.7 837 72.9 1148 
Source: Shimizu, A. Original source: Production and Sales Share in Alcohol Foods 
Industry, and Alcohol Foods Statistics Monthly Report, Daily Economic News Agency 
Shimizu, A. identified four factors which might cause the described changes in the 
market. First, supermarkets have gained power in the Japanese food retail sector. Almost 
8d% of consumers bought nano in supermarkets in 1999 while the share was only 14% in 
1964. Since supermarkets prefer stable and mass delivery of foods, nano makers meet the 
need to produce a large amount of nano on a continuous basis. This has permitted larger 
makers to grow steadily while forcing small nano makers out of the market. Second, 
technological innovation helped makers to become larger. In the 1960's, larger-sized 
facilities and more efficient refrigerators became popular and some makers began to 
introduce these new technologies to replace workers at their plants. This allowed nano 
makers to produce larger quantities ofuniform-quality nano. In addition, plastic containers 
became available to replace more traditional wooden or straw containers. This allowed more 
efficient storage and transportation of nano products. Hence, these changes have permitted 
manufacturers to expand their size and to enjoy significant economies of scale. Third, the 
nano market expanded to the west part of Japan and increased demand for nano. Fourth, 
larger makers built their plants around the country so that they could increase nano 
production as the nano market expanded. Since 1989, top makers began to build several 
plants around the country as the market expanded in broader areas. This has allowed large 
makers to expand their marketing areas to encompass nationwide distribution for this product. 
The impact of the changes on natto soybean demand 
Before the World war II ,soybean food makers used Japanese soybeans and 
soybeans imported from the northern part Of China for tofu and nano. After the war, they 
began to import soybeans for food from the US when the quality of Chinese soybeans 
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declined. Chinese soybean quality suffered due to the weather and the use of inferior 
outdated cleaning and screening techniques as well as older outdated equipment. Political 
uncertainty also motivated soybean dealers to look for suppliers other than China 
(Tachikawa). At that time, distributors were not looking for soybeans suitable for general use 
for food, but instead they were seeking specific types of soybeans that were better suited to 
processing each soybean product. They began to import special variety soybeans and IOM 
soybeans mainly for tofu, and also began to import special variety soybeans for natto 
production. Figure Z shows the supply of natto soybeans by the type and origin. 
MT 
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Figure 2. Supply of soybeans for natto, MT 
Source: Shokuryo Sangyo Shimbum (Food Industry Daily) 
In the natto industry, differentiation has been a key strategy for natto makers, just as it 
has been in the tofu industry. There seems t0 be two major approaches to differentiation for 
natto. One approach to natto differentiation is to use differentiated soybeans with different 
characteristics as raw material (such as Japanese soybeans and organic soybeans) to produce 
natto with specific traits. Because climate and insect problems in Japan create production 
problems, organic soybeans cannot be successfully planted in Japan. Hence organic soybeans 
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are mostly imported from the US, China, and Canada. The other principal means of 
differentiation is to develop a different process for making the natto. By employing different 
production processes, makers can produce natto with different attributes, such as strong 
flavor, more/less stickiness, and so on. No matter which method natto makers use to 
differentiate, soybean quality plays a very important role in the production of natto, even 
when compared to tofu manufacturing. 
Unlike tofu and miso soybeans, some natto soybean varieties are very small seeded. 
Small seed size is considered to be a good property for natto. If the quality of natto soybeans 
is found to be too poor for natto, in most cases, the only viable alternative market is to sell 
them to crushing companies. This typically results in a loss since crushers pay a lower price 
than that paid by natto makers. Unlike natto varieties, tofu soybeans can be still sold to tofu 
makers at a discounted price, even if the quality is low. It is rare for the quality of tofu 
soybeans to be so poor that it is not possible to use them to make tofu. Even though poor-
quality soybeans sometimes reduce the yield of marketable tofu or may not have 
characteristics of top quality tofu, there is a place in the market. In addition, the yield of natto 
soybean is generally much lower than tofu soybeans. Moreover, the quality of natto soybean 
is more susceptible to relatively small variations in weather and climate conditions. 
Therefore, it is more risky for soybeans dealers to deal in natto soybeans than tofu soybeans. 
Because of these special properties of natto soybeans, most natto soybeans have been 
produced under production contracts and shipped in containers from the production area. As 
Tachikawa indicates natto soybeans are procured through closed market channels arranged 
by Japanese traders and US shippers. 
Since natto soybeans have generally been shipped in containers, introduction of IP 
handling has not affected handling methods much. 
2-3 The overview of food soybean trade between the U.S. and Japan 
In this section, we will observe a general picture of food soybean trade between the 
US and Japan. First, the definitions of a distributor and a trading company are established as 
a basis for the following discussion. A description of how food soybeans are physically 
shipped from US farms to Japanese soybean food makers and the roles and the 
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responsibilities of the entities who perform the tasks in each stage of soybean food 
distribution follows. This description is based on the information obtained through personal 
interviews with food makers and food soybean distributors. 
2-3-1 The definitions of a distributor and a trading company 
It is useful to clarify the definitions of a food soybean distributor and a trading 
company in order to avoid confusion. The term distributor, in this paper, is used to describe a 
firm in the food soybean supply system that receives the orders from it' s buyers (either 
soybean food makers or other distributors), makes the orders to it's suppliers (either of 
exporters or other distributors), and procures the food soybeans for their customers (buyers). 
In contrast, a trading company is used to describe "Sogo-shosha" (or an all-round 
trading company in Japanese), a unique type of business organization seen in Japan and 
South Korea. Japanese trading companies do not deal primarily in one specific product or 
product group, but rather deal in many diverse products. A typical leading trading company 
deals in almost anything, including textile goods, industrial goods, raw materials (including 
agricultural products and mineral resources) among other products. There are 9 trading 
companies in Japan. 
We use "a first distributor" to refer to a company that imports food soybeans but one 
that is not among the leading trading companies (sogo-shosha). First distributors may deal in 
diverse products, but the size and scope of their business is actually smaller and the diversity 
of the products handled is less than one would observe in the trading companies. The second 
distributors generally buy food soybeans from the trading companies and/or the first 
distributors and deliver the soybeans to local soybean food makers. According to Mr. 
Takizawa, a CEO of Food Industry News, there are approximately 20 first distributors and 
70-80 second distributors in Japan. 
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2-3-2 The physical distribution of food soybeans-from US farms to Japanese soybean 
food makers 
There are well-established routes of physical distribution for food soybeans moving 
from the US to Japan. Figure 3 shows the routes actually used in the current US-Japan food 
soybean trade. 
There are two principal ways to ship food grade soybeans. One is large-volume bulk 
shipment, and the other is shipment in 20-40 metric-tons containers. Soybeans shipped in 
containers may be either bagged or bulk. Large-volume bulk shipment is used when the 
quantity of food soybean is large enough to use a segment of or all of the cargo hold on a 
bulk ocean ship. There are several types of bulk ocean ship, but the most popular type can 
carry 40,000 metric tons of soybeans. These 40,000 metric-ton ships can be 
compartmentalized into holds capable of hauling 8,000 metric tons. The large quantity 
required to fill the vessel cannot be financed by all trading companies and only the large 
trading companies have the capability to charter the ship in most cases. According to one 
trading company interviewee, there are only four trading companies which can currently 
charter bulk ocean vessels for themselves$. 
One of the typical routes for large-volume bulk shipment is as follows. First, farmers 
ship the soybeans to a nearby country or river terminal elevator. Then, the soybeans are 
shipped by truck, rail, or barge to the export elevator where the soybeans are loaded onto the 
bulk ocean vessel. Bulk shipment is particularly useful for shipping the soybeans for oil and 
other industrial uses. However, IOM food soybeans have generally been shipped in this way. 
The soybeans go through many transit points where commingling may occur in bulk 
transportation. Adoption of I P handling has been a chal lenge for such a bulk system. Some IP 
shipments have been made using bulk methods, but the work of keeping soybeans separate in 
a system has required a great deal of extra effort. 
g They are Mitsubishi Corporatio~l, Mitsui Corporation. Itocl~u. and Marubeni. 
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Figure 3. The physical distribution of the US food soybeans 
Source: Modified the chart in Shokuhin Sangyo Center (Center for Food Industry), p.59, to 
include US portions of the distribution system based on personal interviews and other domestic 
routes. 
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Container shipment has become more popular in recent years, especially after IP 
handling has been more preferred in the food soybean market. As mare makers and 
distributors shifted from IOM soybeans to specific-variety soybeans, containerized shipment 
has increased. Usually, 20 foot-long containers are used for a food soybean shipment. A 20 
foot-long container carries a little bit less than 20 metric tons of soybeans. In most cases, the 
soybeans are screened and bagged before they are loaded into the containers. In other cases 
the soybeans are loaded in bulk. IP handling is generally more reliable when container 
shipment is used, because there is an only small risk of contamination with GM soybeans or 
other "off-types" beans once the soybeans are loaded and sealed in the container. 
As shown in Figure 3, the routes for the distribution of food soybeans are quite 
diverse and complicated. These food soybeans in the bulk shipment system are especially 
difficult to track since they go through many facilities and the fact makes it very difficult for 
researchers to obtain the accurate data of quantities and varieties of soybeans shipped via 
each route. However, according to the distributors interviewed, the most popular route for 
bulk shipment is farms --~ elevators --~ ocean vessel --~ silos at the import --~ screening plant 
at the import -~ warehouse at the import --~ warehouse of the first distributor (or the trading 
company) —~ (warehouse of the second distributor) —~ makers. The most popular route of 
container shipment is farms —~ screening plant of exporters -~ containers —~ container ship 
--~ container terminal at import --~ warehouse of the first distributor (or the trading company) 
--~ (warehouse of second distributor) -~ makers. Note that in the containerized bag shipment 
the integrity of the shipment is established at the screening plant and there is no exposure to 
other product prior to receipt by end users. 
2-3-3 The players and their roles in the food soybean trade 
As indicated above, there are diverse routes in the food soybean distribution. These 
diverse routes come with many patterns of the combinations of the players/agents, and hence 
many patterns of the allocations of responsibility. These alternatives are discussed for the 
typical cases of bulk and container shipment below. 
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The case of bulk shipment (IOM soybeans) 
Figure 4 shows the typical contractual relationship among the players in the IOM 
soybean supply chain. 
First, in the typical bulk shipment, trading companies usually buy the IOM soybeans 
from the US exporters. This is necessary because most Japanese trading companies don't 
own their elevators around Indiana, Ohio, and Michigan. While some companies have 
invested money in the exporters, this is typically not the case. Japanese trading companies 
usually estimate the quantity of IOM soybeans their customers will demand for the coming 
crop year as a first step. 
This is done through the meetings with the customer makers held some times between 
November~and March to permit them to make contracts with the exporters before farmers 
begin to plant. The level of premium, the quantity of soybeans to be purchased, and the types 
of contract provision such as FOB (freight on board) and CIF (cost, insurance and freight) are 
established in these meetings. The exporters can then show farmers how much premium they 
are going to pay before the farmers begin to plant seed. Once the crop is planted, the next 
step occurs at harvest when they collect the food soybeans. In the case of IOM soybeans, no 
varieties are not generally specified (although GM soybeans will typically be rejected). This 
permits the exporters to blend different varieties of soybeans to improve overall quality and 
grade. 
In general, it is the exporter's responsibility to assemble beans from the producers. 
The exporter then ships the soybeans to the export elevators and loads the soybeans onto the 
bulk ocean vessels. Since the IOM soybean exporters are large companies, they contact 
directly with transportation companies. The ownership of the soybeans then passes from the 
exporter to the trading company when the soybeans are loaded on the ocean vessels in a FOB 
contract. In a CIF contract it passes from the exporter to the trading company when the 
soybeans are unloaded into the silo at the incoming ports. The trading companies sometimes 
contract with warehouse companies or crushers at the incoming ports to store and screen the 
soybeans. The warehouse companies and crushers typically own their own warehouses or 
silos at the incoming ports, and some of them own screening facilities as well. 
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Figure 4. The agents in the IOM soybeans supply chain 
Source: Constructed based on the interviews with the distributors and makers 
The warehouse companies and crushers store, screen (seed size, color, and other 
appearance of beans), sometimes blend and bag the soybeans, according to the directions 
issued by the trading company. In most cases, the trading company is simply following the 
customer's specifications for screening and blending the soybeans. 
In this sense, the trading company does not only physically import the food soybeans, 
but plays a key role as an informational medium between the customer (the second 
distributors/soybean food makers) and the agent (warehouse company/crusher). Some 
distributor interviewees stated that crushers have high-performance screening facilities and 
this is why the distributors sometimes elect to use the crusher's facilities (according to Japan 
Tofu Association, approximately 60% of bulk soybeans are screened by crushers, while the 
rest is screened by warehouses). 
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But they also stated that because crushers may have IP handling problems, more 
distributors have begun to prefer using the facilities owned or controlled by warehouse 
companies dedicated exclusively to handling Non-GM food grains. After the soybeans are 
screened, some of them are then shipped in bulk to large makers and to the second 
distributors, while others are bagged and shipped to the buyers. Large makers and second 
distributors usually charter trucks to carry the soybeans to their own warehouses and plants. 
The case of container shiprrcent (Specific variety soybeans) 
Figure 5 shows the typical contractual relationship among the players in the specific 
variety soybean supply chain. 
In the case of container shipment, the Japanese importers are not necessarily trading 
companies, but in some cases are the first distributors themselves. They contract with the 
exporters after they estimate the demand for the coming year, typically before March. In the 
contract they determine the premiums and the area to be planted to each variety of soybeans 
or quantity of each variety to buy (in most cases, they make area contracts). 
The exporters typically make production contracts (area contracts) with farmers after 
they establish the contract between the Japanese buyers (either of trading companies or first 
distributors). Some of the exporters also supply the specific varieties of seeds to farmers. At 
harvest farmers haul their grain to the exporter's storage facility where the exporter screens, 
bags, and stores the soybeans. The exporter ships the soybeans when the buyer calls for it in 
most cases. 
Depending on the type of contract used, the exporter or the buyer charters containers 
and the transportation. Usually, they contract with afreight-forwarder to arrange for the 
chartering vehicles and the actual transportation. Afreight-forwarder locates suitable 
containers and contracts with truck rail/ocean vessel companies to ship the soybeans on 
behalf of the exporter or the buyer. 
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Figure 5. The players in the specific variety soybeans supply chain 
Source: Constructed based on the inter~~ie~~~s with the distributors and makers 
According to the distributors interviewed, ownership of the soybeans moves from the 
exporter to the buyer when the exporter loads the soybeans in the container. But in some 
cases, the ownership of the soybeans moves to the buyer when the buyer receives the 
container at the import. Freight-forwarders never awn the soybeans at any point during the 
transit. 
At the incoming ports, the containers are put in the container yard after they go 
through the required inspection and through quarantine period, and have cleared customs. 
These containers are then directly transported to the warehouse of the second distributor or of 
the soybean food maker. In some cases, the soybeans are carried in the container in bulk 
rather than in bags. In that case, the soybeans are screened and bagged by a warehouse 
company before they are shipped to the second distributors and ultimately to the makers. If 
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the soybeans have been already bagged in the US, they are generally not screened again in 
Japan. Instead, they are shipped to the second distributors and the makers directly from the 
import. They use bulk container shipment (soybeans are shipped in bulk by container) when 
the soybeans are shipped to a large maker. 
28 
CH~7'ER 3 
L.l'T~RA''rUR~ REYI 
In this chapter, the basic theories of business organization, transaction, and an agent's 
behavior are reviewed as an initial step. We will then consider the relationships among firms 
in the food soybean trade and the management of the supply chain for food soybean. In 
particular, we will review several papers by O. E. Williamson, J. Hobbs, M. Sako, and J. 
Rice, respectively. All of them discuss issues related to the functions of the business 
organizations and the relationships among the independent or dependent business 
organizations. After the basic literature review, the implications of the papers investigating 
the roles of trust in business are discussed. These papers include Sako (1995, 1998) and 
Adams and Goldsmith, in particular. Our analysis in the following chapter will greatly utilize 
the discussions of the two papers by Sako. 
At the end of this chapter, the propositions to be discussed in this paper will be stated. 
The propositions will be derived from the theoretical predictions based on the literature 
review. 
3-1 The theory of transaction cost economics 
3-1-1 Transaction cost economics and related theories 
Coase (193 7) mentioned that the existence of transaction costs is the reason that the 
firms replace market transactions. In another paper, Coase points out that transaction costs in 
the market transaction arise from several sources. 
In order to carry out a market transaction it is necessary to discover who it is that one 
wishes to deal and on what terms, to inform people that one wishes to deal and on what 
terms, to conduct negotiations leading up to a bargain, to draw up the contract, to undertake 
the inspection needed t0 make sure that the terms of the contract are being observed, and so 
on (Coase 1988, p.6). 
If the transaction costs in the market transaction are larger than the transaction costs 
generated by internalizing the transaction within the firm, the transaction tends to be 
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internalized. In other words, firms replace the functions proceeded by open markets. Coase 
insists that "a firm will tend to expand until the costs of organizing an extra transaction 
within the firm become equal to the costs of carrying out the same transaction by means of an 
exchange on the open market or the costs of organizing in another firm" (Coase 1988, p.44). 
Coase basically attempts to explain not only the reason far the existence of firms but also the 
degree of the internalization of the market transactions by firms, from the perspective of 
minimizing the total costs including transaction costs. 
Succeeding and refining the Coase's insights, Williamson (1987) insists that the 
transaction costs tend to increase as the degree of specificity of the assets required in the 
transaction, uncertainty in the transaction increase, and as frequency of the transaction is less. 
According to Williamson (1987), transaction costs arise because there always exists 
uncertainty in the transactions and the parties in the transactions are in essence opportunistic. 
Williamson (1987) classifies the commercial transactions into 6 types, focusing on the 
frequency and the idiosyncrasy of the transaction as Figure 6 shows. In the figure, 
Williamson (1987) assumes that transaction costs are in general lower in external 
procurement than internal procurement because external procurement can avoid bureaucratic 
hazards. And in the right-lower box in the figure, site-specific transfer of intermediate 
product across successive stages means that the firm successively procures the materials 
internally in the production process. 
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Figure 7 shows Williamson's classification of the governance structures when a 
relatively higher degree of uncertainty exists. He argues that non-specific transactions are not 
affected by increasing uncertainty because the continuity of a transaction doesn't hold 
significant value since new trading relations are easily arranged. So in the non-specific 
transactions, market exchange continues even though uncertainty increases. But if the 
specificity of the transaction increases, uncertainty matters to the governance structure. 
In Figure 7, trilateral governance stands for the governance structure when the 
transaction is for the most part internally coordinated, but is not coordinated as intensively as 
would be the case in bilateral governance. In the trilateral governance, third-party assistance 
(arbitration) is sometimes employed to resolve disputes and evaluate the performance of the 
agent. In bilateral governance, by contrast, "on the one hand, both parties have an incentive 
to sustain the relationship rather than to permit it to unravel, the object being to avoid the 
sacrifice of valued transaction-specific economies. On the other hand, each party 
appropriates a separate profit stream and cannot be expected to accede readily to any 
proposal to adapt the contract" (Williamson 1987, p.115). Hence, in bilateral governance, the 
parties have stronger incentive than in the trilateral governance, according to him. This is 
because the parties commit more specific transactions. 
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In Figure 7, Williamson insists that as the uncertainty of the transaction increases, the 
parties will organize trilateral governance if the frequency of transaction is occasional, while 
they will organize the bilateral governance if the frequency of the transaction is recurrent. 
Note he claims that once uncertainty arises in the transaction, recurrent transactions will be 
more highly integrated than occasional transactions. This is because he assumes repeating the 
transactions which holds higher uncertainty generates higher transaction costs in the external 
procurement, motivating the parties to integrate the transaction. 
A great deal of empirical research has been conducted to see if the Williamson's 
framework is applicable to individual cases. Palsy conducted a case study of rail freight 
contracting. Palsy observes that when the contractor needs idiosyncratic investment in 
special rail cars to carry their products, the contractor and the rail company tend to engage in 
higher coordination. Palsy relates asset specificity to the following aspects of the governance 
structures. 
First, enforcement concerns how the parties in the contract believe they ultimately 
would be protected from the other's opportunistic behavior. As the degree of the specificity 
in the rail cars increases, they emphasize the significance of threat to withdraw any future 
service or volume, the importance of reputation for the customer companies, and the 
importance of mutuality of interest. The mutuality of interest comes from maintaining a long-
term relationship, preserving a company reputation for fairness, and avoiding any costs 
occurring from changing systems. 
Second, adjustments concern the flexibility of attitudes of parties towards 
renegotiations. Palsy finds that as the degree of asset specificity increases, parties tend to be 
flexible towards adjustment of the original contracts. 
Third, whether parties exchange long-term forecasting and proprietary information 
with each other is found to depend on the degree of asset specificity. As the specificity 
increases, they are more likely to exchange such information. Finally, whether parties discuss 
the future course of transactions is also found to depend on the degree of asset specificity. As 
the specificity increases, they are more likely to exchange information. 
Hobbs (1997) used the survey and the interviews with UK cattle producers to show 
that transaction costs play an important role for cattle producers in determining the way of 
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marketing the cattle. There are two ways to market cattle for the producers in the UK. One is 
the traditional live-ring auction system, and the other is direct sales to packers. Hobbs (1997) 
divides transaction costs into three main classifications: information, negotiation, and 
monitoring or enforcement costs. In the survey, producers were asked to evaluate the factors 
as a numerical value (1 (low) to 5 (high)). And Hobbs (1997) measures the significance of 
these factors in the producer's choice by using an econometric approach. Hobbs (1997) uses 
a Tobit model where the dependent variable is the proportion sold through auctions and the 
independent variables are these factors. As a result, Hobbs (1997) finds that the proportion of 
cattle sold through auctions is influenced positively by the degree of grade uncertainty 
surrounding direct sales to packers, and negatively by the risk that cattle may not sell at the 
auction, the time spent at the auction, the adequacy of packer procurement staff, and so on. 
Then, overall, Hobbs (1997) concludes that transaction costs significantly influence the 
producer's decision-making of the way of marketing cattle. 
Rice points out that while many economists agree with the point that there exists a 
third type of coordination mechanism between markets and hierarchies, none have succeeded 
to make the standard categorization of the third type. Rice calls this third type of coordination 
mechanism an alliance, then classifies business organizations into 6 types as shown in Figure 
8. This figure has been adapted and synthesized by various researchers in an attempt to make 
the standard categorization. The meanings of the words in Figure 8 follow below. 
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The market mechanism and hierarchies in Rice's context accord with the external 
procurement or the market governance, and the unified governance or the integration in 
Williamson's context, respectively. 
Transactional Relationship 
Transactional relationships entail only buy-and-sell activities in a traditional arms-
length relationship. Typically, the activities are accomplished in single transactions 
purchasing products using open market processes to buy products at market prices. 
Alliance (Hybrids) 
This term is used to describe coordination mechanisms where the parties entail more 
than buy-and-sell activities, but are not completely integrated. 
Information Sharing Alliance 
In this type of alliance, the parties share only passive information such as tracking or 
inventory visibility. 
Collaborative Operations Alliance 
In this type of alliance, the parties share information and the alliance entails active 
process coordination in one or more domains, such as product design, engineering, and 
logistics. Sometimes process improvement is planned in the cooperation. 
Collaborative Network Alliance 
In this type of alliance, the parties share information and the alliance entails active 
process coordination. In addition, the parties entails "network-level" financial decisions 
including mutual investments in joint assets and balancing financial risk with rewards. 
Partnership 
Partnerships entail some equity ownership. Equity ownership enables the equity 
owner to coordinate by exercising some control by virtue of owning some of the business. 
The parties sharing equity interests are no longer completely separate entities, because their 
goals and objectives are so similar in the partnerships. Subsidiaries and joint ventures are the 
examples. 
Rice argues that as the parties move to the right in Figure 8, the parties in general 
share increasingly common goals. 
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Rice's categorization focuses on the two aspects of the transactions. One is 
information sharing and the other is financial dependency between the parties. Rice mentions 
that when the transactions need special assets, the parties sometimes share the costs of 
holding the assets and as a result the financial dependency between the parties increases. In 
this point, Rice's categorization corresponds to Williamson's categorization. However, it 
remains unclear how information sharing between the parties relates with the factors 
(frequency, uncertainty, and asset specialty) which Williamson insists jointly determine the 
types of the governance structures. Concerning this point, Rice himself states that "it is 
unclear how successful companies have been developing successful collaborative alliances, 
nor are the key success factors clearly identified and understood" (Rice, p.6). In other words, 
it is unclear what factors motivate the parties to share the information and the risk of holding 
special assets in the transactions. 
3-1-2 The criticisms to transaction cost economics 
Transaction cost economics is straightforward and intuitive. But as Williamson 
(1987) himself indicates, it is very difficult to measure transaction costs. Furthermore it is 
very difficult to predict to what extent and for what reasons a firm will internalize the 
transactions. Because of the difficulty of numerically measuring transaction costs, 
researchers cannot in general even make sure that the firm is really minimizing the total cost 
including the transaction costs. Hence, as Palay and Hobbs (1997) did, the theory of 
transaction cost economics is practically useful only when it is possible to compare some 
existing business organizations and institutions and when we can measure the significance of 
transaction costs, not the numerical values of transaction costs themselves. This fact makes it 
difficult to directly justify the proposition that transaction costs are important factors which 
determine the governance structure of the transactions. 
Another criticism concerns opportunism, one of the basic assumptions of transaction 
cost economics. As we see in the following sections, Sako (1995) points out that opportunism 
is not an important factor at least in some industries. Instead, she argues that developing and 
maintaining trust is very important in many successful (and then longstanding) relationships. 
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While Williamson assumes opportunism is one of the causes of transaction costs, Sako 
(1995) argues that it is not confirmed yet for sure. 
Another criticism concerns the relations between the transactions cost factors and the 
strategic activities actually taken by the parties. Transaction cost theory by Williamson 
somewhat materialistically explains why agents coordinate in some transactions, as we have 
reviewed above. There seems to be a gap between actual strategic choices of firms and the 
more materialistic explanation by transaction cost economics. For mare practical application 
of the theory to the real world, some intermediate framework between the transaction cost 
economics theory and the behavioral theory of the agents could be useful. 
The last two criticisms are on the weak connection between transaction cost theory 
and actual strategic choice/strategy determination process of the firm. Figure 9 may help 
reveal the theoretical focus of this paper. First, it should be noted that transaction cost 
economics essentially claims that the firm will minimize -the total costs occurring in the 
transaction. 
Frequency 
Asset Specialty 
Opportunism 
Uncertainty 
(Total Cost Minimization) 
Governance Structure 
Market Hierarchies 
Transaction cost factors 
Firm's (non) strategic behavior 
(Transaction cost economics theory does 
not explicitly discuss it.) 
(E.g., Rice's categorization of the governance structure) 
Figure 9. The conceptual framework of transaction cost economics 
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Figure 9 illustrates the conceptual framework of transaction cost economics. Note that 
cost minimization is assumed as the firm's activity. This figure indicates that, in the 
transaction cost economics framework, the firm is in essence considered to pursue cost 
minimization. 
This paper attempts to shed light on the relationships between transaction cost factors 
and the strategic aspects of the firm (represented as the right hand side arrow in Figure 9) 
through investigating risk management methods of the firms in the food soybean transaction. 
3-2 The theory of trust 
3-Z-1 Why trust? 
Trust is not a governance structure or a transaction cost factor like frequency and 
asset specialty of the transaction. In the literature, it has been generally agreed to define trust 
as follows. "Trust is an expectation held by an agent that its trading partner will behave in a 
mutually acceptable manner" (Sako 1998, p.89). Similarly, Gambetta closes with the next 
phrase. "[T]here is a degree of convergence in the definition of trust which can be 
summarized as follows: trust. . . is a particular level of the subjective probability with which 
an agent assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action" 
(quoted from Williamson 1993, p.463). Here, trust is considered as a perception (maybe 
intentional strategic or maybe not) of the firm which lies somewhere between the decision of 
governance structure and transaction cost factors. 
We can reasonably imagine that trust could reduce uncertainty in the transactions, for 
example, by reducing the risk of opportunism. Hence, trust would actually help to determine 
the governance structure as a result. In short, we can argue that trust is a perception of the 
firm which could determine the governance structure of the transaction through determining 
the firm's strategies given a transaction cost circumstance. 
Considering this characteristics of trust, we may be able to analyze the relationships 
between transaction cost/risk factors and the firm's decision process for the governance 
structure by investigating the roles and development process of trust in the transaction and 
the sequence observed as the firm's choice of governance structure. 
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In the interviews with Japanese distributors, some interviewees stated that trust is 
important to manage risks in the food soybean transaction. And in fact, in the food soybean 
transaction, longstanding relationships between Japanese distributors and US suppliers with 
cooperative behaviors such as sharing costs and information on the market trends are quite 
prevalent. This could be because trust is playing an essential role in the food soybean 
transaction. 
Considering these facts, the food soybean transaction could be a good example for 
use in investigating the roles of trust in the transaction and to reveal the relationships 
between transaction cost factors and the firm's strategies. Focusing on the roles of trust, we 
will be able to observe the firms' active strategic/non-strategic behaviors which may help 
firms to determine the governance structures given the transaction cost circumstances. 
3-2-2 Trust in transaction cost economics 
According to Williamson (1993 ), trust is a subj ective probability high enough for a 
firm to engage in some form of cooperation. Williamson (1993) categorizes trust into the 
following three types: calculative trust, personal trust, and institutional trust. Williamson 
(1993) argues that calculative trust refers to a type of trust typically observed in economic 
activities. Personal trust refers to a nearly non-calculative type of trust characterized by Ql 
the absence of monitoring 02  favorable or forgiving predilections, and 03 discreteness. 
Finally, institutional trust refers to the degree of uncertainty of external environment around 
transactions. The factors of institutional trust include societal culture, politics, regulation, 
corporate culture, etc. 
Although the definition of calculativeness is not given in Williamson (1993), it is 
considered as "the general condition that I associate with the economic approach" 
(Williamson 1993, p.456). In this context, Williamson (1993) seems to imply that 
calculativeness is one of the characteristics of rational economic. agents. Rationality of 
economic agents is one of the most basic conditions of the economic approach. Rational 
economic agents are self-interested people who attempt to optimize their economic activities 
by using all available information. Such people need to be calculative in using information 
and making decisions in order to optimize their activities. Otherwise, the robabl would Yp Y 
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not be able to use information to optimize their activities. Then, calculativeness may be 
defined as a description of an aspect of rationality that economic agents are either rational or 
bounded-rational and they intend to optimize their activities using all the information 
available to them. 
To be more precise, it may be noteworthy that non-calculativeness is a concept 
different from bounded rationality. Bounded rationality means that economic agents try to be 
rational but they simply cannot be so due to the lack of information and/or limited ability of 
foresight. In comparison, non-calculativeness means that economic agents are not rational or 
may not even try to be so. Non-calculative activities are sometimes irrelevant to economic 
activities that economic agents attempt to optimize. 
Concerning calculative trust, Williamson (1993) argues that "it is redundant at best 
and can be misleading to use the term "trust" to describe commercial exchange for which 
cost-effective safeguards have been devised in support of more efficient exchange" 
(Williamson 1993, p.463 ). Williamson (1993) also argues that trust used in commercial 
exchange is calculated and that trust can be considered as a subset of calculated risk. Thus, in 
short, his main idea is that since trust in economic activities can be completely considered as 
(negative) risk factors without loss of essence, introducing the concept of trust in economic 
analysis is not productive. 
However, Williamson (1993) also admits that it is important to discuss the role of 
other two types of trust in the human society without too strong emphasis on rationality or 
calculativeness. 
3-2-3 Trust in game theory 
Game theory is one of the most important analytical tools used in various academic 
fields including economics. Game theory has been used to analyze interactions of agents 
involved in economic/political transactions. In the framework of game theory, it is generally 
assumed that every agent is self-interested, and opportunism as a version of self-
interestedness is sometimes assumed either implicitly or explicitly. One of the striking 
implications often derived from game theoretic analysis is that cooperative behaviors of 
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agents in transactions can be one of the possible outcomes even if the agents are assumed to 
be self-interested or opportunistic. 
A case in which self-interested agents cooperate with each other is observed when 
agents play the same game repeatedly in every period (repeated games). Fudenberg and 
Tirole state that repeated games may be a good approximation of some long-term 
relationships in economics; particularly those where trust and social pressure are important, 
such as when informal coordination are used to enforce mutually beneficial trades without 
legally enforced contracts. 
Many repeated game models, however, end up with multi-equilibria including both 
cooperation and defect outcomes and fail to give a unique equilibrium. To overcome this 
weakness, the concept of reputation is sometimes used by game theorists. If a player always 
plays in the same way, his opponent will come to expect him to play that way in the future 
and will adjust their own play accordingly (Fudenberg and Tirole). Then, the player who 
holds reputation that he always play in the same way may be able to achieve a desirable 
equilibrium as long as he can successfully maintain his reputation among his opponents. 
Using such reputation effects, some authors have attempted to provide a way to pick and 
choose among the many equilibria of an infinitely repeated game, and they actually show that 
reputation effects do pick out the unique Pareto-optimal payoffs in games of pure strategies 
when the prior distribution on the player's types (long-run players or short-run players) is 
restricted in a particular way (Fudenberg and Tirole). 
Game theory can be a useful tool for the analysis of the roles of trust in the food 
soybean transaction. Although this paper does not utilize game theoretic analysis, future 
research will need to consider the possibility in order to test hypotheses described at the end 
of this chapter. 
3-2-4 Sako's theory of trust 
Sako (1995) criticizes the transaction cost economics approach because it makes a 
strong assumption of opportunism. Sako (1995) came to believe that trust rather than 
opportunism plays an important role in the inter-firm relationship, when Sako (1995) 
conducted interviews with the managers of the parts-suppliers in Japanese auto industry. In 
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the interviews, no interviewees mentioned to problematic opportunistic behaviors in their 
relationships, according to Sako (1995). 
Sako (1995) has completed a good review of the literature on the roles of trust in 
transactions. 
According to Sako (1995), there have been two groups which hold different views of 
trust. One is the group which considers trust as a precondition of economic development. 
This group argues that "trust existed in a state of nature and industrial competitiveness was 
its outcome" (Sako 1995, p.2). But Sako (1995) points out that trust began to play important 
roles in Japan only after the Second World War. Sako (1995) criticizes this assertion because 
it doesn't match the view that trust is a fruit of the culture as the first group insists. 
The other group considers trust as an outcome of economic development. This group 
argues that trust is a by-product of an intensive interaction which is necessary to achieve this 
end. Game theory has become a powerful tool for the latter group. Axelrod argues that 
mutual expectation of infinitely repeated encounters is sufficient to motivate the partners to 
act cooperatively and trust may follow. But Sako (1995) argues that trust is more than 
cooperative behavior. Moreover, Sako (1995) argues that in a finite time period, cooperation 
may never take root or may not be sustained even though it has been established. 
In short, Sako (1995) argues that both of the views are simplistic, and that the reality 
probably lies in between the two. 
Sako (1995) also criticizes transaction cost hypothesis in the following point; 
"[u]ltimately, the development and the maintenance of trust relations require a fair amount of 
resources in frequent communication and information sharing between organizations. It is 
therefore not necessarily economizing on transaction costs (Sako 1995, pp.3-4)". 
This is an important criticism when we investigate the relationship between 
transaction cost factors and firms' strategic activities. In this statement Sako (1995) indicates 
that the possibility that cost minimization by the firm may not always be an appropriate 
assumption. 
Note that ail of the criticisms by Sako (1995) concern to the assumptions in 
transaction cost economics. The assumptions are that the parties are in essential opportunistic, 
and that the parties choose the governance structure to economize on transaction costs. Sako 
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(1995) claims that detailed analysis of the roles of trust and the further inquiry of the reasons 
of existence of trust will be required to test these hypothetical assumptions. 
To better define the role of trust, Sako (1995) first classifies trust into three types as 
follows. 
First, "contractual trust" refers to "the mutual expectation that promises made are 
kept" (Sako 1995, p.4). Contractual trust may be based on a bilateral contract or more 
universal standard or law. In general, written or oral contracts can be made only if 
contractual trust is assumed. And in common sense, opportunistic behavior in a broad 
meaning becomes an issue in the context of whether they hold contractual trust in their 
relationship or not. 
Second, "competence trust" refers to "the mutual expectation that the other party is 
capable of fulfilling his promises" (Sako 1995, p.5). This type of trust concerns to the 
technical and managerial skills of a partner. Assets held by a party can also be an important 
factor for obtaining competence trust. 
Finally, "goodwill trust" refers to "the mutual expectation of open commitment to 
each other" (Sako 1995, p.5). Here, she points out that a commitment is open "whenever an 
actor is willing to respond to a wide range of requests and to take initiatives whenever 
opportunities for mutual benefit are found" (Sako 1995, p.5). Contractual trust is the lowest 
level of trust, while goodwill trust is the highest level of trust. 
Sako (1995) argues that the same outcome may be caused by different factors and 
intentions, and then can be considered as a result of either trustworthy acts or untrustworthy 
acts of the agents. Hence, it is important for firms to decide in what sense the partner is 
trustworthy. For example, Sako (1995) cites a failure to achieve an on-time delivery. One 
possible reason for the delay can be misplaced contractual trust, when the supplier knew they 
would not be able to be in time before the contract. Another possible reason can be just a lack 
of fortune, when a machine malfunctions suddenly and unexpectedly. If their customer knew 
the background of the failure, they could have taken an alternative way of governance to 
avoid the delay. 
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According to Sako (1995), these types of trust are expected to be established by 
different approaches. In addition, Sako (1995) expects that more knowledge and information 
of the partner firm will be required to establish and maintain higher-level trust. 
Finally, Sako (1995) predicts that trust is most useful under conditions of uncertainty 
and bounded rationality, less so when risk calculations are possible in the conclusion. 
Sako (1998) utilizes the same theoretical framework to analyze auto industries. Sako 
(1998) compares the roles and the development process of trust in the automobile industry in 
the US, Japan, Germany, Britain, and Latin Catholic European countries using the data 
obtained from survey to the managers of the supplier companies. Sako (1998) points out that 
technical assistance to the supplier companies by the customer automobile companies has 
contributed toward the establishment of higher competence trust in the supplier-customer 
relationship in the automobile industry in Japan than in other countries. In addition, Sako 
(1998) verifies that such technical assistance has significant effects on the establishment of 
goodwill trust in Japan. Another argument is that "a history of good experience with trusting 
behavior in Japan may have promoted the diffusion of trust" (Sako 1998, p.102). This is also 
verified to some extent through statistical analysis in Sako (1998). These findings imply that 
trust is sometimes obtained through the intentional attempts of the firms, but societal 
environment also affects the possibility of emergence of trust in the business relations. 
3-2-5 Literature on trust in agricultural economics 
In the fields of agricultural economics and agribusiness studies, some research has 
been done on the roles of trust in agribusiness. 
For example, Sporleder argues that "the role of trust in vertical network alliances is 
ubiquitous" (Sporleder, p.4). According to him, the roles include cost savings to the firm and 
enhanced organizational capacities within the firm. Adams and Goldsmith argue that trust-
based alliances reduce costs, increase efficiency, and allow flexibility necessary for success 
in a rapidly changing market place. Adams and Goldsmith argue that trust-based governance 
structures do exist and can perform quite well at higher levels of specificity and transaction 
risk. 
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In addition, Adams and Goldsmith insist that while trust-based governance is not a 
complete substitute for all forms of traditional governance, "the potential for trust to 
substitute for a contract and the ability for trust to offset transaction risk is a function of 
knowledge and predictability" (Adams and Goldsmith, p.241). Then, "by increasing 
knowledge and familiarity between the transaction partners, trust and its power can be 
enhanced" (Adams and Goldsmith, p.242). 
Sporleder and Adams and Goldsmith are important papers related to the focus of this 
paper. The two papers, however, do not explicitly discuss the origin and development process 
of trust using concrete examples. Adams and Goldsmith implicitly adopt the assumption that 
agents are in essence always self-interested. As a result, Adams and Goldsmith treat trust as a 
strategy which the firms consciously choose to substitute for more explicit contracts. 
Two papers by Morrow, et al. (1999, [a] and [b]) study the role of trust in the 
activities of a producer-owned marketing cooperative. Morrow, et al. ([a]) classify trust into 
two types. One is cognitive trust, which is objective in nature and is based on a rational, 
methodical process that results in the judgment that an individual or organization is 
trustworthy. The other type of trust is affective trust, which is subjective in nature because it 
is based on the moods, feelings or emotions that one has concerning the perceived 
trustworthiness of an individual or organization. Using the data collected from the 
questionnaires to member farmers, they find that trust in the general meaning (which can be 
considered as the combination or mixture of cognitive and affective trust in their context) is 
significantly affective to the management and the performance of the cooperative. Morrow, 
et al. ([a]) also find that both Of cognitive and affective trusts are individually affective on the 
decision if they can trust the other members or the organization itself (Morrow, et al., [a]). 
In another paper, Morrow, et al. ([b]) find that affective trust has a positive effect on 
non-financial indicators of performance (e.g., fulfillment of expectation and objective), while 
cognitive trust may have a positive effect on financial performance (e.g., increase in profits 
and revenue) (Morrow, et al., [b]). Their findings are interesting when seeking to identify the 
origins of trust. Cognitive trust may be considered to be consistent with "trust as a by-product 
of an intensive interaction", and affective trust to be consistent with "trust as a state of 
nature" described in Sako (1995), respectively. Therefore, the facts that cognitive trust is 
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positively related to financial performance and that affective trust is positively related to non-
financial performance can be considered to indirectly support Sako's perspective that trust 
can be obtained through both of rational calculation and more ambiguous (and maybe 
societal or cultural) conditions. 
Interestingly, Morrow, et al. ([b]) also find that there is a negative correlation 
between the degree of opportunism and the level of trust. In the status of low trust, they are 
more likely to depend on written contracts. However, since they use general trust (mi~ure of 
cognitive and affective trust) as an independent variable in their model, it is not clear if the 
member farmers intentionally choose either of trust or contract in order to minimize 
opportunism. 
The literature on trust in the field of agricultural economics is not plentiful. While 
some works including what has been introduced above pointed out that trust is an important 
factor in the determination and the performance of governance structure of agricultural 
product transactions, it remains unclear what kind of the roles trust actually plays in the 
transactions. 
3-3 Proposition set-up 
In this section, five propositions to be argued are stated. The propositions are derived 
based on the above literature review, and will be examined in the following chapters. 
First, as Sako (1995) implies, atrust-based relationship can be most useful when it is 
extremely difficult for the parties in the transaction to calculate expected costs and benefits 
under uncertain conditions. Trust-based relationships are usually observed as informal 
coordination between business entities aid are sometimes considered as a substitute for 
formal coordination methods (Adams and Goldsmith). 
Considering these facts, we will set up the first proposition: 
(P1) Informal coordination is likely to be used when it is extremely difficult for 
the parties to calculate expected costs and benefits in the uncertain transactions. 
And the second proposition is: 
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(P2) Trust is a factor for making such informal coordination possible. 
Following Sako's categorization of trust, the third proposition is: 
(P3) Three types of trust (contractual trust, competence trust, and goodwill trust) 
exist in the food soybean transaction. 
As Adams and Goldsmith and Sako (1995, 1998) suggest, the fourth proposition is: 
(P4) Trust reduces transaction risks/costs. 
Finally, the development of trust in the food soybean transaction will be investigated. 
While there seems to be no agreement on the development process of trust among the 
reviewed literature, the fifth proposition is based on Sako's argument that trust can be 
established through both calculative and non-calculative process and the observation in 
Morrow, et al. ([a], [b]}. The fifth proposition is: 
(PS) Trust is developed through both calculative and non-calculative processes. 
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CHAPTER 4 
1WIETHODOLOCY F'OR AI~IAL.YSIS 
To examine and refine the above propositions, the case study approach will be 
adapted in this paper. 
The case study approach is a useful analysis tool when "how and why" questions are 
asked and investigated (Yin). The main objective of a case study is often to seek out the 
answers to these questions on the reasons of an agent's activity. 
The most striking difference between the case study approach and the statistical 
analysis approach lies in the ways of generalization or justification of a hypothesis. In 
statistical analysis, statistical/econometric methods are applied to numerical data collected 
from representative numerous observations to justify/reject a given hypothesis. But in the 
case study approach, a small number of observations are typically available. With a small 
number of observations, statistical methods are often not appropriate for use in attempting to 
generalize/test a hypothesis, but the case study approach can be a powerful method. In 
essence, case study approach is a method of qualitative rather than quantitative research. It is 
a useful method to seek out, refine, and examine qualitative (how and why) hypotheses. 
Almost no information on the contractual relationships between the parties in the food 
soybean transactions was readily obtainable at the time this research was carried out. 
Furthermore, no studies reporting on the contractual relations among grain businesses were 
available. 
Due to the lack of information, two different tasks were pursued simultaneously in 
this research. The first task was to collect basic information on the food soybean industry 
situations, alternative value chains, value chain transactions, and how they occur. This basic 
information was reported in the overview of the industry in the chapter 2 of this paper. 
The second task was to identify the key factors which significantly affect the 
governance structures of the food soybean transactions. Especially, the information about 
risks and corresponding risk management strategies was crucial, since we were originally 
interested in the risk management aspects of Japanese distributor's food soybean transactions. 
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Conducting these tasks simultaneously was especially difficult given the inherent 
restrictions and problems in researching multi-national value chains. The main problems 
encountered are a language problem, the huge geographical scope of the trading activity, the 
numerous institutions involved, and time constraints. Since most interviews were conducted 
in Japan, it was practical to visit them only one time for each during a 4-week visit to Japan. 
Each interview was scheduled to last about 2 hours, although some were less than 1 hour in 
duration due to the schedules of those interviewed. Visits with some exporters in the US were 
hampered by a language problem that could not be avoided. These problems tend to limit the 
quantity and quality of information gathered to some extent. It was also necessary to be very 
careful not to collect inaccurate or biased information as a result of inadequate pre-
information. 
To mitigate these problems, at least two people were present at interviews. In the US, 
Dr. Ginder, my major professor was present at all meetings. In Japan, in most interviews, Dr. 
Tachikawa, a researcher of MAFF who studies the impact of IP handling in the grain industry 
was present. By conducting interviews with these partners, it was possible to correct and 
complement the information collected by comparing notes after the interviews. In addition, 
complementary questions were asked to the interviewees through follow-up a-mails several 
times to verify the information obtained in the interviews. 
A written protocol of questions to be asked to the interviewees was also prepared. 
This protocol was designed to collect basic information, and in particular, the information on 
sources of risks and risk management of the firm in the food soybean transactions. Since it 
was not expected that many interviewees would mention the roles of trust in the food grade 
soybean transaction, the written protocol was not in particular designed to ask specific 
questions about the roles or the development process of trust to the interviewees. The 
protocol provided interviewees the opportunity to identify important factors in transaction 
using their own terminology. 
But the information about trust is still believed to be useful and consistent when the 
following fact is considered. 
When the interviewees mentioned the roles of trust in the interviews, it almost always 
occurred when the interviewees were asked what is an important factor for risk management. 
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This fact provides evidence that the meaning of trust discussed in the interviews does not 
deviate much from the focus of this paper. Once the term trust was mentioned by an 
interviewee, it was actually quite natural to ask further questions on the role of trust and the 
development process of trust in the context of risk management, and there was no prompting 
of interviewees in most cases. Despite the fact that specific questions about trust were not in 
the written protocol, it was identified as an important factor. 
We will employ an "explanation-building" strategy (Yin, p.110) in this paper. This 
approach is useful when researchers don't have clearly established theoretical propositions to 
explain observations before they collect data in the sample cases. The objective of the 
explanation-building strategy is in general to establish and refine the hypothetical 
explanations of observations by comparing the predictions of the hypothesis and actually 
observed events. Yin mentions the interactive nature of explanation-building ,approach, 
pointing out that the final explanation is a result of a series of interactions: 
• Making an initial theoretical statement or an initial proposition about policy or social 
behavior 
• Comparing the findings of an initial case against such a statement or proposition 
• Revising the statement or proposition 
• Comparing other details of the case against the revision 
• Again revising the statement or proposition 
• Comparing the revision to the facts of a second, third, or more cases 
• Repeating this process as many times as is needed (Yin, p.l 11). 
In this method, propositions are compared with observations. and tested to determine 
if the propositions are consistent with the observed facts in each case. After repeating this 
procedure, the refined propositions will be derived as a result of generalization and 
theoretical reasoning of the case observations. 
The analysis of this paper will basically follow this method to test the consistency of 
the propositions and to refine the propositions. 
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As stated above, it was impossible for us to prepare our clearly stated propositions 
before interviews, since no information on the contractual relationship between the parties in 
the food soybean transactions was available. Therefore, it is considered to be appropriate for 
us to apply the explanation building approach to our analysis. 
Throughout the analysis, it is our intent to organize the obtained information in a 
consistent manner along the five propositions. It is expected that this actually will be helpful 
in revealing what should be discussed in any future research. Therefore, the objective of the 
analysis is not as much intended to rigorously test the propositions, as it is to refine the 
propositions by checking the consistency with the actual observations and to build up clearly 
stated examinable propositions through the process. Some problems with this analysis and 
the suggestions for future research will be discussed at the end of the analysis. 
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CH~rER 5 
A1~tAL.YSiS 
In this chapter, we will first describe how individual business parties engage in the 
food grade soybean transactions. The descriptions are based on the information obtained 
through the personal interviews. The interviewees include two US food soybean suppliers, 
one US freight forwarder, eight Japanese food soybean distributors, four industry 
associations (natto and tofu industries), three tofu makers, two natto makers. 
Since the focus of this paper is the risk management procedures used by Japanese 
distributors in food soybean transactions, the information obtained from Japanese distributors 
is especially useful. Then, the relationship between Japanese distributors and US suppliers 
will be described in this paper using the information obtained from Japanese distributors. The 
information obtained in the individual interviews and described in the section 5-1 will be 
summarized to illustrate the general characteristics of the food soybean transactions in the 
section 5-2. Some of the information obtained from other interviewees was used to check the 
accuracy of the information obtained from the distributors. 
In section 5-3, the analysis of the risk management methods employed by Japanese 
distributors will be given: Risk causes and the correspondent risk management methods will 
be first categorized and summarized in this analysis. After that, it is argued that trust could be 
an important factor in risk management by comparing the five propositions and the 
observations obtained in the interviews. 
-1 Indl~lid ual case observations 
Trading company A (inter►~ic~vees: the I~Ice ~lirector and assistant manager of grain 
department) 
Trading company A is one of t~~e leading trading companies in Japan. Company A 
deals with multiple product categories including various foods, minerals, manufacturing 
machineries, textile goods, and so on. The total ?001 sales of company A was approximately 
600 billion dollars (1 dollar = 120 Japanese yens). 
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The volume of grains (including corn, soybean, wheat and others) handled by 
company A was about 5 million metric tons or about 18% of the total grain imported into 
Japan. Company A is the second largest Japanese trading company in the wheat and soybean 
trades, according to company A's homepage. Two or three merchandisers in the food and oil 
seed department of company A take responsibility for all the business in the department. It is 
not unusual, among the trading- companies, for the firm to place responsibility on a small 
number of merchandisers. In many cases, relatively few merchandisers take care of every 
grain business task in the trading company. Merchandisers travel throughout the world to 
find suppliers and negotiate with trade partners. There is little seasonality to the 
merchandizing activities. They are generally quite busy around year in both the northern and 
the southern hemisphere. 
Company A has typically imported food soybeans by way of the bulk shipment 
system. More recently, it has begun to trade more in specific variety soybeans. These specific 
variety soybeans are shipped by container transportation system to insure strict IP handling 
which has become increasingly popular. In the variety soybean transactions, a production 
contract is usually used with the spot market employed as a balancing mechanism to acquire 
or dispose of marginal quantities. The spot market currently occupies only 10-20% of the 
total quantity handled by firms. 
Company A deals with 4 to 5 varieties of soybeans for tofu. Company A imports 
soybeans from Canada, Brazil, the US, and China. Company A trades with 2 to 3 exporting 
companies in Canada and also trades with 2 or 3 companies in the US to import soybeans, 
mainly from Michigan and Minnesota. One of the largest grain exporters in the world is 
among its US trading partners. Its business relationship with the large US trading company is 
a longstanding one that has continued for several decades. 
Company A seeks out and negotiates trades and contracts with the suppliers to import 
soybeans from abroad. Company A then sells the soybeans into the Japanese domestic 
market either to distributors or directly to the tofu/natto makers. However, this does not 
necessarily mean that company A actually handles every individual process of the import 
directly. In most cases company A subcontracts with other entities more specialized in 
specific importing and logistics activities including transportation, loadin unloadin rains. ~ gg 
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The regulatory paper work required to allow the imported soybeans to be admitted to import 
and be unloaded at the import by officials is also subcontracted in many transactions. The 
subcontractors then conduct the activities on company A's behalf. Many of the Japanese 
trading companies and distributors commonly follow a policy of subcontracting out these 
activities. 
The commissioned entities do not generally take title to the soybeans. The trading 
company typically retains title throughout the transit process. In some cases, the 
subcontractors have a strong connection with the trading company in terms of financial 
dependency and long-term business relationships. This further strengthens the ability of the 
trading company to achieve performance through subcontracting. 
An informal contract is usually made between the customer buyers and company A in 
a period from November to March. They do not usually make written formal contracts at this 
time. Company A makes orders to the suppliers after they have received informal orders 
from the customer buyers. The customer buyers typically make their final decision to buy the 
soybeans only after the soybeans are harvested and after they have actually tested to 
determine the quality of soybeans. 
Price risk can be hedged by using futures markets, according to the manager of 
company A. Therefore, supply risk (harvested quantity risk) is the most important and 
difficult to manage. While company A tries to hedge the supply risk by trading with multiple 
suppliers and corresponding production areas, company A sometimes cannot fulfill the 
demand due to inadequate quantity. When this occurs, company A attempts to find 
alternative soybeans, but locating acceptable alternative suppliers is often difficult. As a 
result, company A cannot always fulfill the demand. 
Quality risk is also problematic for company A. Since production contracts between 
the suppliers and company A generally do not include conditions on the content qualities 
(e.g., protein content, oil content, etc. ), company A has to purchase all the soybeans produced 
even though the content quality may be lower than desired. Company A then negotiates with 
the customer buyers to accept the soybeans when content quality is lower, but sometimes the 
customers refuse to accept the lower content soybeans. In that event, company A must sell 
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the soybeans to other buyers. These sales are typically made at lower prices than that 
company A would have received, so company A incurs a lass on the lower-quality soybeans. 
Other problems such as delay of the shipment and damage to soybeans can and 
sometimes do occur in the transaction. When such problems occur, company A attempts to 
identify the causes for the problem and which party is responsible. If one party is revealed to 
be responsible for a problem, the cost of the problem will generally be borne by that party. 
But if the problem is the result of factors beyond the control of either party, both company A 
and the supplier share the cost. This process is accomplished through negotiations. Such 
negotiations are informal in nature. Formal contracts do not usually specify what to do in 
case of a problem. 
According to the vice director, it is important to trade with trustworthy suppliers if 
settlement through negotiation is to be possible and effective. Long-term relationships with 
the suppliers in the transaction are also quite important in getting acceptable negotiated 
settlements. 
Trading company B (interviewee: assistant manager of oil seed department) 
Trading company B also deals with multiple product categories including foods, 
minerals, airplanes and so on. The total sales of company A in 2001 was approximately 75 
billion dollars. 
Company B deals with 20-30 varieties of soybeans, trading with 20-25 suppliers in 
the US, Canada, and China. Company B has branches around the US and generated about 20 
million dollar in grain trade sales between the US and Japan in 2001. As is usual for Japanese 
trading companies, only a small number of merchandisers manage and assume the 
responsibility for company B's food soybean business of company B. 
Company B uses both the bulk system and the container system. The movement of 
soybean by the container system has become more popular since the late 1990's when GM 
products became an issue. With the IP handling requirement the transaction itself didn't 
change, but more document work was necessary than before. The IOM bulk system needed 
to be modified to segregate Non-GM soybeans and to keep them separate from GM soybeans. 
The suppliers actually d0 the initial segregation work necessary for IP handling. Company B 
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visits the supplier's elevators once a year to examine the fields and the facilities, and to 
communicate with the suppliers about consumer preferences and ways to meet that demand. 
In the IP system, an identification numbers is allocated to each producer and that number is 
put on each of the bags of the soybeans prior to shipping. This permits company B to trace 
back to the individual farmer if the soybeans in a bag violate the Non-GM purity standard. 
The assistant manager stated that neither company B nor their suppliers can guarantee 
the content quality of soybeans, and the contracts generally do not specify the content quality 
conditions. Standard quality factors such as damage, split, and GM contamination are 
included in the contract. The assistant manager also pointed out that production contracts are 
used to procure specialized soybeans when it is not possible to procure them in other ways. 
Company B is very careful when it is selecting a partner supplier. 
The food grade soybean transaction needs to be flexible because it is nearly 
impossible to strictly state and enforce every condition in the written contract. Informal 
renegotiation is often required to solve unexpected problems, according to the assistant 
manager. When the assistant manager and other colleagues negotiate with the suppliers, they 
do not typically use bluffing as a strategy to gain advantage in the trade. The assistant 
manager stated that suppliers may respond to the bluff by breaking off the negotiation and/or 
getting out of the business relationship. The manager stated that for the special soybeans in 
production contracts, changing the supplier to another is the last option to be used as a means 
to solve problems. 
The manager also stated that it is most important to find trustworthy production areas, 
suppliers, and producers to avoid risks. Exchange of general trade information about other 
companies' activities and about the food soybean industry and soybean market is important 
as a means to maintain good relationships with suppliers. Company B annually holds a 
meeting with the contracted producers as a means to foster better communications. The 
assistant manager stated, in addition, that a good personal relationship and a history of 
successful transactions are also important to keep good business relations. 
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First distributor C (interviewee: manager of soybean department) 
First distributor, C, is one of the 70 larger soybean distributors in Japan. Company C 
imports 40-50 specific varieties of soybeans from the US, Canada, China, Australia, and 
Brazil. Company C also deals with IOM soybeans and ordinary soybeans for oil. Company C 
lacks necessary capital and. customer buyers to successfully charter bulk ocean vessels for 
itself. Therefore it has to buy bulk soybeans from the trading companies if it wants to sell the 
bulk soybeans in Japan. Company C sells the soybeans to the second tier distributors or 
directly to individual soybean food makers. 
In 1998 and 1999 container shipments began to increase dramatically when the 
industries shifted from IOM to specific variety soybeans. Container shipment has been used 
for natto soybeans since the latter part of the 1980's, but bulk shipment for other food 
soybeans was dominant at that time. Although only large firms have the capability to use 
bulk shipments, container shipments can be used by any firm including smaller firms that 
lack the experience to charter ocean vessels. 
When the Japanese buyers of food soybeans shifted from IOM to Non-GM and 
variety specific soybeans, company C began to communicate more frequently with the 
suppliers to discuss the consumers' needs. Before that, company C simply accepted the 
produced soybeans and didn't talk with the suppliers about the possible improvements of the 
attributes that would better meet consumer preferences and needs. 
Company C trades with local-based medium/small seed companies to obtain the food 
grade soybeans, rather than larger seed companies. According to the manager, the 
transactions with small/medium companies are more flexible and open the possibility to 
make more specific orders for soybeans with detailed characteristics. The manager argues 
that the larger companies usually do not prefer to manage orders with more detailed 
specifications. Larger Japanese trading companies generally seek economies of scale in grain 
and trade with a small number Of merchandisers from the larger companies. The larger 
companies simply cannot afford t0 deal with various kinds of detailed specifications. 
Company C has invested money t0 develop new varieties of soybeans. Company C 
works together with a university breeding program t0 develop the seed. If the seed is 
successfully developed, a local seed company then buys the license to multiply the seed. 
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Company C enters into a production contract with a supplier to produce soybeans from the 
seed, and for the exclusive purchase of the special variety soybean. 
The manager stated that quality risk and price (premium) risk are the most important 
to consider, and that a trustworthy relationship is important to mitigate these different risks. 
The special variety soybeans in such production contracts are unique and company C cannot 
easily find alternative suppliers. Since individual suppliers are good at supplying different 
varieties of soybeans, it is important for company C to keep a good relationship with each 
individual supplier. The contract with suppliers does not include content conditions, but other 
standard grade factors such as foreign materials, moisture content, skin crack, and heat 
damage are included. If the standard grade factors are nat fulfilled, the prices are discounted. 
A GM test is done before the container is shipped to Japan. The soybeans are also 
tested at the export in the US. The threshold level for GM is 2%. The soybeans are tested 
after they arrive in Japan. If the GM contamination i s found to be over 2% through the test 
done in Japan, the soybeans will be sold for oil, and will not be sold for food use. Fortunately, 
company C has never experienced this problem before. There is a very real risk of 
contamination since GM soybeans are also screened and bagged in the same facilities in 
which Non-GM soybeans are handled. 
The formal contract does not specify the content quality. If content quality is low, 
company C generally accepts the soybeans. Company C then negotiates with their customer 
buyers to accept the soybeans or mixes the soybeans with other varieties to improve the 
overall quality. In those cases when the quality is too low, company C simply sells the 
soybeans for other uses than food. 
When a problem occurs, company C first investigates the cause of the problem. If the 
problem is found to be the supplier's fault, the supplier will compensate for it. If the problem 
is found to be from an uncontrollable cause, company C negotiates with the supplier and 
determines an equitable settlement. 
The relationships between the suppliers generally continue for a long time. Ten to 
twenty year relationships are quite common, and some relations have endured for more than 
30 years. 
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First distributor D (interviewee: assistant manager of grain department) 
The first distributor D was originally an oil soybean company when it was founded 
about a hundred years ago. Now company D and other family firms deal with various 
materials including oil soybean, food soybeans, cosmetics, plastics, and so on. About 100 
employees are working in the group and the total sales amount approximately 2 hundred 
million dollars. 
In 1987, company D exclusively began to import Vinton 81 variety soybean from a 
supplier in Iowa. The supplier screens and bags'the soybeans and the soybeans are all 
shipped by containers. Currently company D trades with 2 other suppliers in Iowa and 
Michigan. 
In each January, company D hosts selected managers from its suppliers at a meeting 
where they discuss the contract for the coming year. In February, company D estimates the 
demand from its customer buyers. Company D then communicates with the suppliers about 
the estimate, but the formal order is made only after company D actually receives the formal 
order from the customer buyers. It was unsure who takes the risk of mistakes in forecasting 
demand from the information obtained in the interview. 
If a problem occurs, company D first investigates the cause and then makes it clear 
who has responsibility for the problem. The way of settling the problem depends on who is 
responsible for it. If the cause is not manageable by either of the parties, the cost is shared by 
both of company D and the supplier. Hence, the most important thing is to investigate the 
cause and which party (if any) is directly responsible. 
Company D has had several incidents where insect eggs were found on the exterior of 
bags of the organic soybeans at import. Quarantine insect treatments were required by 
Japanese law before they could enter the country legally, so the soybeans lost value as 
organic soybeans. Company D investigated the causes of the problem and found that the eggs 
were laid at the supplier's site. Company D then discussed the problem with the supplier. 
Through discussions, the parties concluded that it would have been almost impossible to have 
found the eggs and have got rid of them before the soybeans were loaded into the containers. 
They decided to share the loss of the organic soybeans with the supplier. They discussed 
alternative methods for preventing this problem, and ultimately decided that the supplier 
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should load and ship the organic soybeans as soon as possible once the soybeans are 
harvested. 
Production contracts with the suppliers generally do not include specific content 
quality conditions. Hence, company D generally accepts the soybeans even when the content 
quality is low. Contracts with customer buyers generally do not specify content quality 
conditions, so company D negotiates with the customer buyers to accept the soybeans. If the 
buyers refuse to accept them, company D negotiates a discounted price or sells the soybeans 
to other uses than foods. 
Company D's customer buyers require stable quality and quantity of soybeans. 
Therefore company D asks the suppliers to establish a reliable and consistent process for 
production, handling and shipment of soybeans. 
Company D sometimes trades with brokers, but it does not use brokers routinely as a 
business practice because it does not know whether the broker can be trusted until an 
experience base has been developed. Hence, company D starts dealing with small amounts of 
soybeans first, then increases the amount gradually as it knows about the broker better. 
In the past, when the demand for food soybeans was expected to be large, many 
Japanese firms entered the food soybean trade, and contracted with suppliers. But once the 
supply was found to be excessive, the Japanese firms cancelled some of the contracts. This 
has happened two or three times in 1980's and 1990's. As a result of these actions by 
Japanese firms, the US suppliers and farmers have become more careful and sometimes 
hesitate to make production contracts with Japanese buyers. This has made it more difficult 
for the Japanese buyers to find suppliers of food soybeans than in the past. 
First distributor E (inten~iewee: the manager of soybean department) 
Company E deals in more than 7 brands of soybeans. One of the brands of soybeans it 
sells includes a blend of two varieties. Company D buys some of the types from a leading 
trading company. 
Company D uses a production contract when a specific variety of soybean is needed. 
Since natto makers are more likely to demand special varieties of soybeans than other 
soybean food makers, many natto soybeans are produced under production contracts. Large 
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scale natto makers can procure the soybeans and undertake large amounts of risk, but small 
and medium makers cannot bear such risks as easily. Small and medium scale makers buy 
soybeans from distributors at higher prices to avoid undertaking risks that are too large to be 
absorbed. Since natto soybeans are small-seeded and particularly specialized for natto 
production, they are high value soybeans. If the quality is unsuitable for natto production, the 
soybeans must be sold for other lower value uses such as feed and oil. Under these 
circumstances they bring much lower prices. Hence, trading natto soybeans involves much 
higher risk than other less specified food soybeans. 
As company E has shifted to Non-GM soybeans, production contracting has increased 
and more containerized shipments have been used. However, the features of transactions or 
relationships with suppliers have not changed significantly even after IP handling was 
introduced. The relationships with suppliers are typically very long term. Company E has 
traded with one of its major suppliers for more than 20 years. 
First distributor F (interviewee: the chief manager of the company) 
Company F deals only in bagged soybeans. Company F suspects that IP bulk 
shipment cannot achieve GM contamination levels low enough to convince its customer 
makers of their purity. Then it decided to procure only bagged soybeans. 
In the case of bagged soybeans shipped by container, there is almost no risk of 
contamination once the soybeans are bagged and loaded into the containers. This type of 
handling also reduces the amount of testing and inspection. It is usually sufficient to check 
the warehouse and screening facilities prior to bagging. Either the supplier or a third-party 
conducts the inspection. Company F receives only the certification, thereby eliminating the 
need for checking the facilities for itself. Company F tests GM contamination of the 
soybeans when it receives them and again before it sells them to the customer tofu makers. 
Company F uses a production contract for the half of ordered soybeans and uses spot 
markets for the rest of the soybeans. This strategy permits company F to control the amount 
of supply and hedge some of the transaction risks. 
Company F has imported organic soybeans from the supplier in Iowa for about 10 
years. 
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Second distributor G (interviewees: the president, the former president, and the manager 
of the company) 
Company G deals with both IOM and specific variety soybeans. About half of the 
total volume of soybeans is IOM, and the rest is variety soybeans. Company G deals with the 
US, Canadian, Japanese, and Chinese soybeans. Company G buys all the IOM soybeans and 
some of the specific variety soybeans from trading companies. 
Company G began to directly buy specific variety soybeans from the suppliers several 
years ago. When company G trades with a supplier for the first time, it does not make the 
whole payment until product is received. It pays half the amount when the soybeans are 
loaded in the containers. When it receives the containers, it pays the second half of the 
payment if the soybeans meet standards. Company G has experienced some troubles with 
suppliers before. In one case, company G received the wrong variety of soybeans, and in 
another case, it only received half of the contracted quantity. When such problems occur, it is 
very difficult for company G to negotiate with its suppliers, as a result of the language 
problem. When company G uses trading companies, this kind of negotiation or 
communication problem is eliminated, because the trading companies have staff who are 
bilingual and have more knowledge on trading with foreign suppliers. 
According to the interviewees, company G seeks to gain more experience in direct 
business if direct business is to be used on a wider scale. Since small lot and diverse variety 
business are expected to increase as the demand for IP handling grows and the diverse needs 
of customers increase, company G wants to increase its direct business in the future. 
Second distributor H (interviewee: the president of the company) 
Company H-buys most of the soybeans it handles from trading companies, and sells 
them to the local customer makers. But company H began to directly trade with the US 
suppliers over the past several years. While the amount is still not very large, experience is 
being developed. Among the reasons why company H started doing business directly with 
suppliers are Ol the fact that company H can directly communicate with the suppliers and ~2
the fact that the direct business has positive PR effects on the customer tofu makers. 
However, the negotiations with the suppliers are very difficult, and this kind of 
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communication difficulty does not occur if company H trades with trading companies, 
because trading companies have expert employees and much experience of imports, 
according to the interviewee. Company H attempts to mitigate the quality and quantity risks 
by trading some alternative suppliers. If problems occur, company H usually negotiates to 
discount t e pnce. 
5-2 Cross-case observations 
Based on the individual interviews with food soybean distributors, an attempt will 
now be made to describe in general how they trade food- soybeans. Since the number of 
interviewees was limited, use of statistical methods is not appropriate to describe the 
characteristics of food soybean transactions. It is, however, still possible for us to describe 
the essential facts and the relationships among these facts by observing the information 
obtained from those individual interviews. 
Six major practices described as below were used to characterize the nature of the 
food soybean transactions. 
First, the relationships between Japanese food soybean distributors and US food 
soybean suppliers are usually longstanding. Relationships that have been in place for more 
than 10 years are not uncommon and some were even longer. 
Second, while some interviewees stated that the distributors have the opportunity to 
procure undifferentiated food grade soybeans from many alternative suppliers, it is, in fact, 
quite rare for the distributors to frequently change suppliers. Other interviewees pointed out 
that it is actually very difficult to find alternative suppliers when they attempt to procure 
more differentiated special varieties of soybeans that must be procured under production 
contracts. In these cases it is less motivated to select from a wide variety of alternative 
suppliers. 
Even though problems may have arisen in the transactions, it is rare to change from 
one supplier to another unless the problems resulted in severe damage to one or both of the 
parties. When problems do occur, the parties in a transaction usually investigate and identify 
the causes of the problems and who should take primary responsibility for them. The parties 
usually carry out the investigation themselves rather than using third parties to arbitrate 
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conflicts. If a problem is due to negligence or misconduct of a party's activity, the party will 
take the responsibility for the problem and compensate for the partner party. If a problem is 
because of some uncontrollable or unexpected event, both of the parties will usually share the 
costs occurring arising as a result of the problem. 
Third, especially when contamination with GM soybeans may be a problem, on-site 
monitoring production and handling practices by Japanese distributors is not usually 
intensive. Certification by the producers/suppliers or a third party is used in place of desired 
inspection and monitoring. Merchandisers employed by Japanese distributors generally visit 
suppliers only once or twice a year. In some cases, Japanese distributors simply receive 
certification documents from suppliers and are not personally involved in monitoring the 
activities for themselves. Japanese distributors do carry out GM contamination tests and 
quality tests when they receive soybeans. While these tests cannot always detect GM 
contaminated soybeans, these GM tests are usually believed to be accurate enough to avoid 
GM contamination by Japanese distributors. 
Fourth, concerning soybean quality, it is popular not to include component contents 
(e.g., protein content and sugar content) in food soybean production contracts. Therefore, 
Japanese distributors usually bear the risk associated with abnormally low component 
content. The distributors test the soybeans before they receive the soybeans, but they are 
usually obligated to accept all the soybeans even in those cases where the content quality is 
low. 
Fifth, informal contracts are commonly used when the customer makers place orders 
for soybeans to the distributors. Formal written contracts are made only after makers take a 
final decision to actually buy soybeans from the distributors and then only after testing the 
content quality of sample soybeans. 
Other forms of informal contracts including renegotiation are frequently employed in 
the transactions between Japanese distributors and US suppliers in the cases where an 
unexpected problem occurs and the formal contract does not specify how to resolve such a 
problem. 
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Finally, some interviewees stated that trust is important in the food soybean 
transactions. The precise meaning of trust depends on the context and the individual 
interviewee, as will be observed in more detail in the following sections. 
5-3 Analysis 
Risks and the causes in the food soybean transaction 
In this section, the major risks for the soybean distributors in the food soybean 
transactions are categorized into the following six types: ~1 GM contamination risk, 02  low 
standard quality risk, ~3 supply shortage risk, ®low content quality risk, ~5 shipment delay 
risk, and a6  insect damage risk. 
GM contamination risk arises when either producers or suppliers, or both deal with 
GM soybeans besides Non-GM soybeans. In soybean production, there is no natural 
pollination risk similar to the one in corn production. Rather, the contamination could happen 
when seed is contaminated or when either of its suppliers or producers inadvertently mix 
Non-GM soybeans and GM soybeans. 
Low standard quality risk arises when uncertainty matters in the fulfillment of 
standard conditions defined in the US and international grain standards. Split soybeans, 
discolored seed coats, over-dried soybeans, and too much foreign materials are examples. 
Supply shortage risk refers to the possibility that the suppliers cannot fulfill the 
contracted amount of soybeans or the supply is much less than expected. 
Low content quality risk refers to the possibility that the content of important 
components in the soybeans is lower than expected. Low protein content and low fat content 
are the examples. 
Shipment delay risk is literally the risk of the delayed shipment of the soybeans. 
Finally, insect damage risk refers to unexpected insect problems. For example, the 
insect problem that the assistant manager of first distributor D mentioned arose unexpectedly. 
Neither of the parties could expect the problem to occur when they made a contract. Thus, it 
was difficult to prevent the problem before the problem actually happened. 
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Once insect problems occur, the quality of the soybeans can deteriorate as a result. Or, 
as in the case of company D, it can significantly decrease the value of soybeans. Although 
insect problems can be considered as a cause of risk (probably as one of the natural risk 
factors) that affect the supply and the quality of soybeans, we separately categorize it. This is 
because insect problems illustrate an interesting and unique issue concerning to the 
management of the risk as described later in the paper. 
Second, the causes of these risks can be categorized into 4 types: Ql nature, 02
uncontrollable accidents, ~3 negligence, and ®opportunism. 
It is sure that natural events such as weather conditions affect the soybean production. 
Uncontrollable accidents are the non-nature events which cannot be expected or controlled 
by any means by any parties. 
In contrast, negligence can be avoided if each party is careful enough. The drunken 
driver who hit another car probably did not intend to hit the car. However, if he is cautious 
enough not to drink too much before he drives, he is much less likely to cause the car 
accident. Negligence can be caused by lack of carefulness and/or experience. Then, 
negligence risk mainly refers to the competence of a firm. 
Finally, opportunism is a selfish and intentional act for its own interest which 
sometimes appears as cheating and/or betrayal. In the driver's example above, opportunistic 
behavior may appear as the drunken driver's dishonest act of hiding a fact somehow that he 
l 
is seriously impaired due to alcohol intake. Opportunistic behaviors include dishonesty, 
cheating, betrayal, and any other possible reckless or self-interest actions9. 
Note that the parties in the food soybean transactions cannot control nature and non-
nature uncontrollable causes at all. They can control negligence and opportunism to some 
extent. Whether the parties can control root causes of a risk does matter and how the parties 
manage the risks as well will be described in the rest of this chapter. Note that for an event to 
be controllable, the event needs to be expectable, since it is impossible to control an 
unexpected event. 
We relate the risks and the four types of causes by using the information obtained 
from the interviews. See Table 10 for the summary of the hazards and the causes. 
9 See Williamson (1979) for the original definition and discussion of opportunism. 
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Table 10. Risks, the causes, and the coordination methods from the viewpoint of the soybean 
distributors 
Ra.sk Cause Coordination 
. Contam~nat~on 
Negligence, 
Formal contract Uncontrollable accident, 
Opportunism 
Low stare daxd 
quality 
(appearance, 
damage) 
Nature 
(e.g., weather), 
Negligence, 
Formal contract, 
Informal coordination 
O ortunism 
Supply shortage 
Nature Area contract 
(D~strlbutors and suppliers . share the risk) 
(e. g., weather), 
Negligence, 
Opportunism 
Low content uali q ty 
(component) 
Nature 
Informal coordination 
between d.~str~butors and makers and/or 
between suppliers and dlstr~butors 
h r (e. g., weat a ), 
Negligence, 
Opportunism 
. Shipment delay 
Nature, Negligence, 
Uncontrollable 
accident, 
opportunism
Formal contract, 
Informal coordination 
Insect damage Nature (insect), Formal contract, Informal coordination Negllgence 
Notes: 
A cause with an underline is a main cause for the risk. 
A cause with a wavy line is a relatively minor cause for the risk. 
Negligence is the main cause in GM contamination risk in the food soybean 
transaction. Opportunism may not be a serious cause in GM contamination. An 
uncontrollable accident could be one of the causes. For example, when seed is contaminated 
and the parties cannot recognize it before the producers plant the seeds, but the 
contamination may be found to be significant when the soybeans are harvested. 
Nature and negligence mainly influence standard quality of soybeans. Negligence 
occurs when careless handling in harvesting, loading, unloading, and storing the soybeans 
results in the damage to the soybean quality. Nature may also matter, but careless handling 
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affects the standard quality of the soybeans most significantly, according to some distributor 
interviewees and the information given by a farmer who is engaged in IP handling of food 
soybean (Karko sh) . 
Soybean supply is most significantly affected by uncontrollable conditions in nature 
(e.g., climate and other environmental conditions). Opportunism could also be a cause of the 
risk for the distributor, when its supplier opportunistically ships the soybeans to other 
distributors, given the originally contracted distributor a false reason why the supplier cannot 
collect enough soybeans. Negligence of the supplier may be a concern if the producers 
contracting with the suppliers decide to opportunistically ship the soybeans to other suppliers 
for a better price. It would arise as a result of the lack of intensive controUmonitoring of the 
supplier. While the situations stated above were not observed in the interviews, these acts 
could possibly happen. 
Nature affects content quality risk significantly. Negligence could also affect the 
content quality. For example, if producers are not skilled enough to respond to some of the 
environmental changes and cannot properly act, and then content quality may probably 
become low. Opportunism may matter, since the producers and the suppliers may not have 
strong incentives to work hard to achieve high content quality, at least in the myopic 
viewpoint because content quality risk is not included in the formal contract (Ramesh). 
Shipment risk can be caused by any of the three causes. 
Some distributor interviewees stated that shipment delay is not generally a big 
problem, because they can easily mitigate the risk by ordering soybeans from the suppliers 
well before the deadline when the distributor needs to receive the soybeans. Hence, it is less 
interesting and less important to discuss shipment delay risk in this paper. 
Finally, insect damage can be caused by nature and negligence. Recall the story of 
company D once again. The insect problem was basically not avoidable because it was 
extremely difficult to find the eggs on the bags of the soybeans, but the parties could at least 
lower the probability of the problem by quickly loading the soybeans and shipping them as 
soon as possible after harvest or storing in temperature controlled area. 
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The management of the risks (Argument about PI) 
(P1) Informal coordination is likely to be used when it is e~remely difficult for 
the parties to calculate expected costs and benefits in the uncertain 
transactions. 
In the interviews, it turns out to be clear that the written contract (or formal contract) 
between a US supplier and a Japanese soybean dealer generally includes the terms on 
standard quality and GM contamination. 
When suppliers receive the soybeans contracted from individual producers, they 
generally test the standard quality and GM contamination. When Japanese distributors 
receive the soybeans from the US suppliers, the distributors generally test the standard 
quality, GM contamination, and the content quality. If the GM contamination level is found 
to be above the threshold, the soybean is typically rejected immediately. If the standard 
quality is lower than the. contracted standards, they generally negotiate and discount the 
soybeans. 
However, even though the content quality may be low, there are no formal 
contractual conditions for the content quality. Therefore, the distributors generally accept the 
soybeans and negotiate with their customer buyers to accept the soybeans, or sell the 
soybeans for non-food uses typically at lower prices. So the content quality risk is generally 
transferred to the distributors and/or the customer makers. In some cases, the distributors 
negotiate with the suppliers and share the costs to settle the problem. 
Supply risk is also shared by both the distributors and the suppliers if the contract is 
an area contract. In fact, most contracts are area contracts, and fixed quantity contracts are 
not common in the food soybean production contracts. 
Unexpected insect problems are usually solved by informal coordination. Recall once 
again that the distributor D usually shares the cost of insect damage with the supplier after 
investigation and renegotiation. 
See Table 10 for the summary of these observations. 
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By relating the risks, the causes, and the methods of managing the risks, it was 
observed that the parties are likely to use formal contracts to manage the controllable or 
intentionally manageable risks such as GM contamination risks and standard quality risks, 
and that the parties are likely to use informal methods of coordination (or renegotiation) to 
manage somewhat more uncontrollable risks such as content quality problems. 
Note that it is possible to calculate a distribution and an expected quality of soybean 
content relatively easily by observing the past content qualities. Even if it is impossible to 
accurately predict content quality, it is at least possible to calculate average content quality. 
This may allow Japanese distributors to calculate expected cost/benefit of uncertain 
component quality levels. However, it was observed that content quality is not usually 
included in formal contracts at least for the present. 
Therefore, P 1 seems to be consistent to the observation of the fact that GM 
contamination and standard quality are included in the formal contract and insect problems 
are not included in the formal contract. However, P 1 may not be consistent with the fact that 
component quality is not included in the formal contract. 
From the above discussion, it can be argued that whether the event is controllable is 
more related to the risk management method, than whether the expected cost/benefit of the 
event can be calculated. 
To examine this proposition further with the information currently available, it may 
be useful to consider necessary conditions for the formal contracts to work well enough for 
mitigating the controllable risks. The observations retain some implications for this problem 
as below. 
First, all the parties must believe that the risks are expectable and controllable. This is 
a quite natural idea since it is generally true that nobody wants to bear costs as a result. of an 
event which none of the parties can control. 
Suppliers and producers should understand that they can mitigate the risks of GM 
contamination and low standard quality by careful handling. Some distributor interviewees 
stated that they hold meetings with producers one or more times in a year and explain the 
importance of IP handling and other careful in handlings. Such an activity can be considered 
as an effort by distributors to enhance the producers' understanding and to encourage them to 
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handle the soybeans more carefully. As a result of such meetings, the distributors can expect 
better handling by the producers and suppliers. Then, such activities by distributors can be 
one of the methods for them to control the risks of GM contamination and low standard 
quality in the absence of a formal contract. 
Then, only if the parties know that the risks are controllable somehow, will the formal 
contracts be the easiest and most efficient short cut to manage the risks in the transactions. 
When the parties have to deal with uncontrollable risks, formal contracts may not be the most 
efficient way. 
Another necessary condition for formal contracting to be the best method for risk 
management is the ability to detect whether or not the partners properly conduct their tasks. 
If this is not possible, neither parties is able to precisely evaluate the actions of the other 
party. Since measuring performances is difficult, the risk of opportunistic behavior by either 
or both parties may increase, thereby making formal coordination methods inefficient. 
In the food soybean transactions, the parties can measure the degree of GM 
contamination and the standard quality by using sample tests relatively easily and accurately. 
While sampling used in these tests is not always consistent with the true attributes of the 
soybeans, the tests are practically good enough to measure the properties of the soybeans and 
determine whether the partner parties did proper jobs. 
When the parties know that a certain risk is controllable, the parties manage the risk 
in formal contracts. But if the parties believe that the particular risk is caused by 
uncontrollable factors, it is very difficult to include the condition in the formal contract, and 
then the parties have to look for other ways to coordinate the transaction. 
From the above discussion, it is not concluded that P 1 is consistent with all of the 
observations. Based on the discussion, a modified proposition P 1' follows: 
(P1') A formal contract is likely to be used if both parties believe that the event 
is controllable and if the performance of the actions is detectable. 
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The types of trust observed in the food soybean trade (Argument about P2 and P3) 
(P2) Trust is a factor for making informal coordination possible. 
(P3) Three types of trust (contractual trust, competence trust, and goodwill trust) 
exist in the food soybean transaction. 
In the interviews it has been observed that most distributor interviewees mentioned 
that trust is important in the food soybean transactions. The precise meaning of trust, 
however, is observed to depend on the context in the individual interviewee's comments. 
Therefore, first of all, it is necessary to distinguish and categorize the observed meaning on 
trust in each context. 
As Sako (1995, 1998) describes, contractual trust is a necessary condition for the 
parties to make a contract between them. They would not make any contracts if they don't 
trust each other in the sense of contractual trust. 
We can reasonably assume that both of the Japanese firms and US suppliers trust each 
other at least in the sense of contractual trust, because the trading companies and distributors 
actually make a ,contract with the suppliers in the food soybean trade. Otherwise, we would 
observe a lot fewer contracts in the food soybean transactions. Contractual trust could be an 
interesting topic if many violations of formal contracts and related conflicts among the 
parties are observed. However, this is not the case in the food soybean transactions. 
Production contracts in the food soybean transactions are usually longstanding, and then 
somewhat successful. Therefore, we will not intensively discuss contractual trust in this 
paper. 
Careful observation of the comments made by the distributor interviewees indicated 
that the interviewees, in fact, mean more than simply contractual trust. The vice director of 
trading company A stated that trust is important to make renegotiation possible and effective 
when a problem occurs in the transaction. It seems clear that the vice director expects its 
supplier to comply with company A' s request for renegotiation when a problem occurs, even 
though these activities are not usually explicitly specified in the formal contracts. In addition, 
as other distributors mentioned in the interviews, Japanese distributors and US suppliers have 
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to individually or sometimes jointly investigate the causes of a problem. They usually detect 
who is primarily responsible for the problem through their own investigation without 
depending on arbitration by third parties. 
Suppose that either of the distributor or the supplier behaves opportunistically in the 
event of investigation and renegotiation, and tries to hide the true causes or gives false 
information to the other party to protect its own interest. Then renegotiation will be probably 
unsuccessful in most cases. Hence, to settle problems in informal coordination, the parties 
should know or at least should believe that the partners will not behave opportunistically in 
the investigation and the renegotiation. 
Note that if a party is trustworthy only in the sense of contractual trust and not in the 
sense of goodwill trust, that party does not necessarily always behave honestly, especially 
when behaving honestly results in accepting a loss for the party. Thus, implementing the 
renegotiation and investigation requires a higher degree of trustworthy relationship with 
goodwill trust than contractual trust between the parties. 
Trust which the vice director of trading company A referred to obviously does not 
mean competence trust. His comment implied that he would expect a supplier's honest 
actions even though the formal contract does not specify how the parties should act when an 
unexpected problem occurs. Thus, we can consider that the statement by company A implies 
that the distributor not only expects contractual trust but also expects goodwill trust in the 
food soybean transaction. 
In other contexts, they sometimes mean competence trust. For example, the assistant 
manager of trading company B stated that the most important task required to mitigate risks 
is to find trustworthy suppliers, producers, and the production areas. In this context, it could 
be noted that the manager referred to the supply reliability, or competence trust in the 
suppliers and producers, rather than goodwill trust in them. 
The observation described above implies that we need to recognize that all the three 
different types of trust categorized by Sako (contractual trust, competence trust, and goodwill 
trust) exist in the food soybean transactions. In addition, note that some interviewees pointed 
out that higher levels of trust (goodwill trust) than contractual trust are important for making 
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informal coordination such as renegotiation possible. These facts are considered to be 
consistent with the implications that the propositions 2 and 3 indicate. 
The roles of trust (Argument about P4) 
(P4) Trust reduces transaction risks/costs 
We have observed that competence trust is important before and after the parties have 
begun food soybean trades (recall company B's observation). Japanese firms seek out 
competent trustworthy suppliers, producers, and production areas before they make a 
contract. After they make a contract, they exchange information including market and 
demand trends. Japanese distributors visit producers and suppliers and explain to them why 
they require careful handling of soybeans. 
Goodwill trust is also important because the parties generally attempt to solve 
unexpected problems through informal coordination such as renegotiation, as company A 
stated. 
Many distributor interviewees invest in educating their suppliers and producers and 
exchanging information through holding annual meetings with producers and suppliers. 
Competence trust and goodwill trust could be obtained through education and information 
exchange. It can be argued that competence trust and goodwill trust have the effect of 
mitigating problems of negligence and opportunism, and thereby decreases the need of 
intensive monitoring. As shown in Table 10, negligence and opportunism are considered to 
be the causes of almost all of the hazard events. Therefore, maintaining trust-dependent 
relationships in the transaction can reduce the probability of all of these hazards occurring. 
We have observed that goodwill trust plays an important role in allowing the parties 
to settle the problems caused by uncontrollable factors through informal coordination. 
Without goodwill trust, it will be very difficult to internally settle the problems and more 
problems will need to be arbitrated by third parties. 
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These observations may allow us to argue that trust reduces transaction costs such as 
monitoring costs and arbitration costs, arguing that the observations are consistent with the 
proposition 4. 
In order to confirm that the suggestion is valid by using more data in future research, 
we may be able to refine the proposition 4 as follows: 
(P4') Competence trust reduces the probability of the risks caused by negligence, 
while goodwill trust reduces the probability of the risks caused by both of 
negligence and opportunism. 
The development of trust (Argument about PS) 
(PS) Trust is developed through both calculative and non-calculative processes. 
Now, we may wonder why longstanding relationships (and maybe trust dependant) 
are popular in the food soybean transactions. 
Company B stated that changing from one supplier to another is the last option to 
solve conflicts since the soybeans under production contracts are so special that it will not be 
an easy task to find the alternative suppliers. Many interviewees stated that they preferred 
longstanding relationships with the suppliers and such a relationship basically assumes 
internal coordination to solve problems in the transaction as company B stated. 
Some food soybean dealer interviewees mentioned that it would be possible to find 
alternative suppliers. But in fact, most of the relationships between the distributors and the 
suppliers are longstanding one. Some of the interviewees pointed out that longstanding 
relationships with trustworthy suppliers are a key factor in the food soybean transaction. 
These observations indicate that while the distributors recognize the possibility of finding 
alternative suppliers, they tend to choose longstanding relationships with specific suppliers 
which may be trust-dependent relationships. 
The vice director of trading company A stated that trust is important to make 
renegotiation possible and effective when they must settle problems. This statement implies 
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that he recognized the important role of trust when they attempt to settle problems in the food 
soybean transaction. He also stated that along-term relationship is important in establishing a 
trustworthy relationship, and some other distributor interviewees agreed on the point. 
Based on these statements, we can observe some form of interaction between 
longstanding relationships and trust. The parties seek out trustworthy partners in terms of 
competence trust before they enter into business relationships as company B stated. After 
they enter into business relationships with those partners who possess competence trust, 
longstanding relationships help them to foster another type of trust, goodwill trust, between 
them. 
Company B stated that exchanging information with its suppliers on market trends, 
activities of other trading companies and consumer's wants is also helpful for improving the 
relationship. Company B stated that exchanging this kind of information helps the parties to 
understand each other, and helps them to build a tighter relationship between them. While the 
information is not always necessarily directly related to their business, even casual 
information exchange can be important in understanding each other. This plays a role in 
building up good relationships with its suppliers, according to company B. 
Some other distributors, as well as company B, visit their suppliers at least once a 
year, and hold meetings with its suppliers and producers. These activities can be interpreted 
as an effort to establish atrust-dependent governance structure rather than monitoring the 
partners. In fact, the distributors cannot monitor the suppliers and the producers all around 
year. Visiting once a year is simply not enough to effectively monitor their performance in 
the absence of intent and goodwill. Therefore, it is more reasonable to consider these 
activities as communications designed to establish a higher degree of trust as a substitution 
for monitoring them more intensively. 
Such communications are helpful to foster both competence trust and goodwill trust. 
Besides these communications, trading companies A and B stated that personal relationships 
between a merchandiser of the Japanese firm and a supplier is also important for keeping 
good relationship between the parties. The manager of the first distributor D agreed on this 
point and stated that the president of the company D and the president of one of its main 
suppliers have been good private friends for several decades. This kind of informal 
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relationship may ultimately help to maintain a trustworthy long term relationship in the 
business. The longstanding relationships accompanied with such personal relationships and 
casual information exchanges have helped the parties to understand each other better. As a 
result, it has helped establish trust-dependent relationship between them. 
There is a need to understand the mechanism for starting a relationship. How do 
parties begin to enter the trust-dependent relationship when they did not trust each other at 
the beginning of their relationship? None of the second distributors F, G, and H had 
conducted direct business with the suppliers until several years ago. So they are relatively 
new entries to the international food soybean trade. All of the three interviewees pointed out 
the difficulty of communications and negotiations with the US suppliers, mainly because of 
language problems. As the president of company G stated, these newly entering distributors 
have not obtained enough experience and knowledge in the food soybean trade. Trust has not 
been established between these second distributors and the suppliers yet. Therefore, they 
need to manage the higher subjective/objective risks in the transaction. 
One of the methods used to deal with the risks is to start with dealing with a small 
amount of contracted soybeans. Another method is that a distributor makes full payment only 
after the actual receipt and testing of the soybeans, as distributor G does. Since these second 
distributors want to continue doing direct business and to increase the direct procurement 
from the suppliers, the distributors will increase the size of the trades as they gain knowledge 
and experience in the transaction and as the distributors and the suppliers understand each 
other more fully. 
It is reasonable to assume that both a calculative and anon-calculative process result 
in the establishment trust in the food soybean transaction as Sako and Williamson pointed out. 
We can argue that the proposition 5 is consistent with the observations.. 
There is insufficient data to determine whether the parties intentionally make these 
efforts in order to foster either or both of the two_ types of trust discussed in this paper. 
However, the limited observations still allow us to make up the hypothesis to be examined in 
the future research. It was argued that the main reason for a distributor to hold the annual 
meetings is to foster the competence trust through the education of the suppliers and the 
producers. Both competence trust, and goodwill trust were observed to exist and play an 
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important role in the food soybean transactions. From this argument, we may be able to 
refine the proposition 5 as follows: 
(PS') The distributors are calculative when they educate the partner suppliers 
and producers and exchange information to foster competence trust, while 
education and information exchange repeated and continued for a long 
time unintentionally foster goodwill trust. 
~~ 
CH~'ER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Through the case study analysis, it has been observed that the five propositions are in 
general consistent with the information obtained from the interviews. The findings are 
summarized below. 
In the food soybean transaction, it is observed that there are controllable and 
uncontrollable sources of risk. The Japanese distributors managed controllable risks by 
utilizing formal contracts while they managed uncontrollable risks by using informal 
coordination (P 1'). All of three types of trust (contractual trust, competence trust, and 
goodwill trust) are observed (P3) and these types of trust play important roles in making 
informal coordination between the distributors and US suppliers possible (P2). In addition, 
these types of trust can reduce transaction costs or risks in the food soybean transactions (P4). 
Finally, trust in the food soybean transactions is fostered by both calculative and non-
calculative processes used by the parties in the transactions (PS). 
By analyzing the roles of trust in the food soybean transactions, it was revealed that 
Japanese distributors strategically and sometimes non-strategically choose the governance 
structure based on the types of risks and the levels of trust between Japanese distributors and 
US suppliers. It was argued that Japanese distributors can strategically foster trust in their 
suppliers' ability to produce and handle soybeans properly. In contrast, goodwill trust 
appeared to be a fruit ofnon-strategic behavior such as personal relationships and casual 
communications between Japanese merchandisers and US suppliers. 
Tables 11 and 12 summarize the findings and analysis results. 
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Table 11. Summary of findings 
Findings 
Ql Longstanding relationships are common. 
~2  It is difficult for distributors to find alternative suppliers. 
Q3 Monitoring is not intensive. 
~4  Casual exchange of general information on markets. 
Q5 Content quality is not included in formal contracts. 
Q6 Informal coordination is common. 
Table 12. Summary of analysis results 
Analysis Results 
(~1 Informal coordination was likely to be used for managing 
uncontrollable risks. 
Q2  Three types of trust (contractual trust, competence trust, and 
goodwill trust) are observed. 
~3 These types of trust can be necessary conditions for informal 
coordination. 
® Thus, three types of trust can reduce transaction costs or risks 
in the food soybean transactions. 
Q5 Trust can be fostered by both calculative and non-calculative 
process. 
The findings and analysis may have some important implications for US suppliers. It 
would be useful for US suppliers who want to initiate soybean trading with Japanese 
distributors to understand that Japanese suppliers look for suppliers who hold three types of 
trust. Entering the relationship with an appreciation of these expectation could enhance the 
opportunity of a successful long term trading relationship. It is an obvious fact that suppliers 
who do not hold contractual trust will be less able or perhaps unable to make contracts with 
any distributors. Competence trust is another necessary condition for successful business in 
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the food soybean transactions. The ability for US suppliers to produce and handle soybeans 
in a stable and consistent manner is quite important. Suppliers without competence trust 
before they initiate transactions need take the steps necessary to prove that they hold 
competence trust. One possible approach to the establishment of competence trust is to trade 
just a small amount of soybeans with distributors for trial. This trial may take several years to 
prove that the supplier has the capability to supply consistent quality and quantity of 
soybeans. 
Once suppliers have proved that they hold competence trust, there will be a higher 
probability of continued contractual relationships with distributors far a long time. But 
competence trust is not a sufficient condition for successful relationships. Since there is a 
possibility that hazards caused by uncontrollable factors harm parties in the transactions, the 
parties must be able to manage the problems occurring from such uncontrollable factors. In 
many cases, parties solve problems caused from uncontrollable factors through informal 
coordination mechanism such as renegotiation. Goodwill trust may play important roles in 
helping the parties to employ informal coordination. Goodwill trust can be fostered by both 
calculative and non-calculative processes. Longstanding relationships can help parties in the 
transactions to develop goodwill trust in anon-calculative manner, including casual exchange 
of general information on the soybean market, activities of other companies, and so on. 
Information exchange through educational seminars for producers conducted by distributors 
may also be helpful for developing goodwill trust. 
To enhance the justification of these propositions, further research will be necessary. 
Since the available information was not rich enough to completely reject possible rival 
hypotheses, it is crucial for us to collect more detailed information through dedicated 
research. More in-depth case observations of firms' recognition and management of risk, 
firms' intension to foster trust, and the roles of each type of trust in the transaction will be 
especially useful and interesting. In addition, the information from the perspective of US 
suppliers will be useful to describe the transactions and the roles of trust in the transactions 
more vividly. 
From the theoretical aspects, it may be useful and important to consider the role of 
reputation and experience in the food soybean transactions using the framework of repeated 
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games. Such a game theoretic approach can give us different perspectives on the role of trust 
and can generate alternative hypotheses to explain what we have observed. 
We believe that this paper could, at least, describe essential factors in the food 
soybean transactions and then point out what should be discussed in future research. We thus 
hope that this research will be a good starting point for the fruitful future research. 
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